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ABSTRACT
The American Constitution has been the subject of heated
debate since its formation. This article simply introduces a new
argument. It suggests that there exists a “form”1 of an
Enlightenment era code, which is met by the Constitution, and that
the requirements of this form can be derived from inspection of the
three great codes of the time: the Prussian, the Austrian, and the
French. It further notes that these requirements are (1) Roman law
influence; (2) natural law influence; and (3) that they perform the
same functions—they abrogate the prior laws on their respective
subjects and they are “complete” in themselves, covering the
whole aspect of a legal field. In the process of doing so, the essay
shows that the common law was not the only source of inspiration
for the framers of the Constitution; it also shows heavy civil law
influences. The article opens with a “preliminary title”, which
introduces the subject, its sources, and instructs the readers as to
1. This notion of form comes from Aristotle instead of Plato. Instead of the
form existing outside and entirely separate from the thing under discussion, I
find that the form may exist within and be discoverable in, the things under
discussion.
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how to read the article itself. The whole closes by laying forth a
few broad possible consequences of accepting this view, while
leaving a full discussion on the consequences of this understanding
to a later article.
I. PRELIMINARY TITLE2
A. Introduction
The Age of Enlightenment (commonly “the Enlightenment”)
lasted throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and the nineteenth
centuries. This era observed some of our world’s most pivotal
moments: the Renaissance came to an end; a global economic
climate was just starting to appear; slavery was being banned in the
western world; the divine right of kings was—at last—being
challenged; Napoléon was gaining ground in his conquest of
Europe, only to meet defeat at Waterloo; the British Empire rose to
prominence; the once-prestigious Holy Roman Empire fell into
oblivion; and a new republic was born across the sea, destined to
grow into a super power in its own right.
But not all important events of the Enlightenment were
geopolitical. Philosophy was having yet another reformation.
During this age of man, humanity was given the minds and
thoughts of brilliant political theorists and jurists such as Locke,
Rousseau, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Martini, Voltaire, Puffendorf,
Domat, and Grotius, to name only a few. These people laid the
foundation of our modern society. They gave us the separation of

2. The term “preliminary title” was chosen for this section instead of
“introduction” as it does far more than merely introduce the subject. Indeed, the
first subsection under this heading is “introduction.” This term is in reference to
that portion of modern codes which lays out what the sources of law are and
how the document is to be interpreted. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1-14. I have
organized this first section of the paper in much the same fashion. I give the
sources of my criteria, and describe how this essay is to be understood. Even the
introduction names sources, for those events and minds described therein played
vital roles in setting the stage for the Codes and the Constitution.
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powers, limited self-government, the French Encyclopédisme,3 and
codification of law in new form.
This humanist movement saw one of the few instances where
high thought would be brought down and put into practical
application.4 Many saw that the law of nature (natural law) could
be a source of the positive law, or instruction on what that should
be. The robust spirit of the age described gave hope that law could
be eternal and that principles of the same could be written down
for all humanity, not just Europe, not just the Western hemisphere,
but for all of the world. To achieve this end, civilians developed
codes.5 But natural law was not the sole source of these
documents. It is indisputable that the drafters looked to Roman
law6 and customary law7 to forge these great codes.
I do not mean “code” in the contemporary sense.8 For example,
I do not mean a publication in which statutes are kept and
constantly updated, as one would describe the U.S. Code. Nor do I
mean a book into which one collects pre-existing rules of law
without, inter alia, usurping the prior law, which is more properly
3. This compilation of work was intending to put all of human knowledge
in one place. It dealt heavily with philosophy and law. Some have even noted
the larger movement around this document, calling it “French Encyclopédisme”.
See generally Mitchell Franklin, The Encyclopédiste Origin and Meaning of
Fifth Amendment, 15 LAW. GUILD REV. 41 (1955-1956) [hereinafter The
Encyclopédiste].
4. Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Future of The Civil Law, 37:3 LA. L. REV. 645,
647 (1976-1977) (Explaination, logic and reason were never divorced, however,
from social reality; the civil law absorbed these higher law elements “without
detriment to the practical needs of society”).
5. Roscoe Pound, The Influence of the Civil Law in America, 1:1 LA. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1938) (explaining universal validity of the codes); see also H. Patrick
Glenn, The Grounding of Codification, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 765, 766 (19971998) (explaining the codes’ capability to extend beyond Europe).
6. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 111-23 (Cambridge
Press, New York 2007) (explaining Roman law influences in the three great
codes) [hereinafter ROMAN LAW]; see also Pan. J. Zepos, The Legacy of the
Civil Law, 34:5 LA. L. REV. 895, 902 (1974) (stating “The Roman law, together
with customary law . . . formed the chief sources of inspiration for the great
codifications.”).
7. Id.
8. I must digress briefly and say that I am not the first, nor shall I be the
last, to point out features of codification. See JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, LE
CONCEPT DE CODE EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE DU XIIIe AU XIXe SIECLE (1967).
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called a Digest. A code, in the understanding of this essay is an
Enlightenment code; or, as has been described by previous
scholarship, a natural law code.9 These are documents created from
the above-mentioned sources that serve a distinct function and
require a distinct form of interpretation.
The function is both of completeness and abrogation. These
two concepts will be reviewed more thoroughly below but deserve
mention here. Codes in the understanding of the Enlightenment,
were to be all-encompassing.10 This doctrine meant that all
possible situations dealing with the type of law covered by the
codes were to have their decisions based on the same—the codes
covered everything and were meant to extend for centuries.11 To
realize this end, two methods were used; discussion on which will
wait for the appropriate article. Abrogation, on the other hand, is a
more simple function to discuss.12 Put briefly, these codes,
although drawn from prior law, dispensed with the control of the
prior law.13 Lawyers were not permitted to cite to the former rules,
as the codes were the sole source of law.14
9. See generally Horst Klaus Lucke, The European Natural Law Codes:
The Age of Reason and the Powers of Government, 31 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 7
(2012). By this I mean that these codes were heavily influenced by the
eighteenth century and medieval understandings of a “higher law” based on
human reason.
10. Glenn, supra note 5, at 766.
11. Id. See also Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of
Codification, 48:5 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1988) (stating, “Codes last much
longer than ordinary statutes, some lasting centuries; they are subject to
(usually) very minor and very rare changes.”).
12. I must make an aside and note that the new drafting of the Louisiana
Civil Code lacks an abrogation article.
13. Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code in
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 37 (2012) (showing
the need for an abrogation clause and the necessity of breaking from the prior
law); see also Bergel, supra note 11, at 1074 (“[the codes] repeal [] the old legal
system (laws, ordinances or customs) that were dealt with specifically in the
new civil code.”).
14. From an earlier draft of the Prussian Civil Code, THE FREDERICIAN
CODE: OR, A BODY OF LAW FOR THE DOMINIONS OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA:
FOUNDED ON REASON, AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY at Pt. I, Bk. I,
T. II, § 5 (Jean-Henri-Samuel Formey & Alexandre-Auguste de Campagne
trans., Edinburgh 1761): “. . . we discharge the advocates from quoting hereafter
the authority of the Roman Law or that of any doctor whomsoever.” [hereinafter
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There is now almost no dispute that three codes in particular
are considered great among their peers.15 It is from these three
codes that the author has drawn his understanding of the
Enlightenment codes. They are, the Allgemeines Landrecht für die
Preußischen Staaten (ALR), drafted under King Frederick of
Prussia (hereinafter called the Prussian Civil Code); the Austrian
Civil Code, drafted largely by Martini, under Emperor Joseph of
the Holy Roman Empire; and the Code Napoléon (hereinafter
Code civil), drafted under the guidance of Portalis and passed
under the eyes of Napoléon Bonaparte.16 Moreover, reference from
time to time may be made to the Louisiana Civil Code, which has
been described as “the most perfect child of the Civil Law.”17
Even though all these events were taking place in Europe, one
should not ignore what was happening “across the pond.” As one
may tell by the title of this essay, there was yet another document
in the same vein as the three great codes. It, too, as will be shown
below, meets all three requirements for being an Enlightenment
code. It has Roman law and Natural Law sources, and can be
characterized by its “completeness”18 and has lasted over centuries

THE FREDERICIAN CODE]. See also ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL
LAW 131 (Harvard Univ. Press 1981) (stating, “the preexisting law ceases to
have even subsidiary force.” “The Code itself becomes the historical starting
point.”).
15. Lucke, supra note 9 (discussing the Prussian, the Austrian and the
French Codes); see also Glenn, supra note 5, at 767 (noting the poetic majesty
of the Code civil); Zepos, supra note 6, at 902 (drawing particular attention to
the French Code civil and the Austrian Civil Code); and Cueto-Rua, supra note
4, at 650 (stating “The Civil Law gave full recognition to this basic philosophy
in the three great codes enacted at the end of the XVIII Century and the
beginning of the XIX Century: the Code Napoleon in France, the Civil Code for
the Kingdom of Prussia, and the Austrian Civil Code.”).
16. Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 651 (discussing the Code Napoléon, the
Prussian Civil Code, and the Austrian Civil Code); see generally Lucke, supra
note 9 (discussing the Prussian Civil Code, the Austrian Civil Code and the
Code civil).
17. John T. Hood, Jr., The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18 (1956).
18. The broad provisions let generally applicable rules stretch forward
continuously and to unseen situations. Moreover, since the Federal government
is one of the enumerated powers, the specific listing of those powers (and those
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with comparatively little revision.19 Therefore, what Field said
more than a century ago shall be proven true on a different basis:
the United States Constitution is “a great code in a small
compass.”20 Thus, the thesis of my paper is this: The American
Constitution may be properly understood as an Enlightenment
code, regardless of the specific intent of the framers, because it
meets three criteria discovered by reference to the three great
codes: it has heavy Roman law influences, natural law influences,
and serves the two primary functions of the codes—(1) it abrogates
control of the Articles of Confederation and the English common
law on the subject of foundational national law, and (2) it is
“complete in itself,” as it, by use of broad generalities and specific
enumeration, covers the whole arena of fundamental law for the
nation and is capable of extending eternally forward with little
revision.
B. Answers to Two Objections
Throughout the crafting of the arguments in this essay, I was
confronted by several objections raised by classmates. Instead of

necessary and proper to the same) means that the Constitution is literally
complete as to all the basic rules of our government. This rule will be dealt with
more fully in Article III of this essay.
19. There are several other similarities between the documents, which are
not discussed fully in this paper. The documents all arose out of much
controversy, political upheaval, and philosophical change. The controversies and
turmoil surrounding Civil Codes has been noted before. (Bergel, supra note 11,
at 1077). They are held in almost the same reverence. Of the Civil Codes it was
said, they “are Constitutions for civil society.” (Glenn, supra note 5, at 769).
They are drafted in much the same way, as Professor Moréteau has noted,
“reforming a civil code is like amending a constitution. One may imagine a
process comparable to a Constitutional convention.” (Moréteau, De
Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 64). Moreover, as an explanation of the title
below will lay out, they are both oriented toward the citizens and are meant to be
understood by the same.
20. MICHAEL KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION at
vii (Penguin Books 1986) (citing 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 379 (A. P. Sprague ed., New
York 1884)).
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hindering my endeavor, these objections actually helped to sculpt
my writing. As such, I will briefly address them here.
It was argued that since the Constitution deals with public law
matters and not private law matters it could not be considered a
“code” like the civil codes of the Enlightenment. This seemed to be
a troublesome argument. However, upon closer inspection, it fails.
Codes do not have to deal with one specific area of law. They may
cover either private law or public law so long as they conform to
the three requirements above. The Prussian Civil Code has sections
that deal with what today we would call “public law;”21 drafters of
both the Austrian and Prussian Codes wanted to put more public
law into them, which, as noted by another author reaches into what
is commonly considered Constitutional governance.22 Moreover,
even some modern codes that have their basis in the three great
codes have provisions that would seem to deal with public law
matters, such as Louisiana Civil Code article 671, which states, in
pertinent part, “[w]hen private property is so destroyed in order to
combat a conflagration, the owner shall be indemnified by the
political subdivision for the actual loss.”23
It was also argued that the Constitution was drafted prior to the
completion of the three great codes. Therefore, they argued, how
could the framers have taken the ideas of drafting that the
Europeans used? I answer that timing is of no import here. I do not
argue that the framers stole their ideas for drafting broad articles
from the French, or that specific enumeration was stolen from the
Austrians or Prussians. These ideas for drafting pre-date all of
these documents. I argue merely that the same thing occurred.
Thus, the Constitution is the result of a sort of convergence.24
21. For Prussian, see Lucke, supra note 9, at 21 (citing to Pt. II, tit. 11, § 1).
22. Id. at 21-28.
23. This is especially true since, like the Enlightenment codes, the
Louisiana Code is “natural law based.” Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note
13, at 41.
24. Convergent evolution: A process in evolutionary biology where two
unrelated species develop similar traits in response to similar circumstances.
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Certain characteristics were obtained in response to certain
conditions (here, the Enlightenment, Natural Law, and Roman law,
consequent with political and philosophical changes) to achieve a
certain end (a code serving a particular function). This is not to
say, however, that the two had no influences on each other.
C. What this Essay is not Intended to Do
I do not mean, nor should the contents of this essay in any way
be taken, to disrespect either of the two systems of law discussed
herein. I place this disclaimer here due to several experiences I
have had while at law school. Attending a bijural institution has led
to several remarks that gave me pause. Some professors advocated
that Louisiana simply rid itself of the civil law, others remarked,
“the next time a civilian is kind to the common law will be the first
time.” This same animosity has reached to students. Some of who
have uttered phrases such as, “there’s no difference between the
two systems anymore;” or “Louisiana is a common law state with
different words.” One may attribute this not infrequent hostility to
civilian professors “feeling like a minority and [developing] an
inferiority complex”25 or to common law advancement in
Louisiana. After all, LSU is the only law school in the state that
requires civilian training.26 In the end, both the civil law system
and the common law system have positives and negatives. There
are strong similarities between the systems; but this may be due to
the near homogeny of European civilization for centuries.
Moreover, although it was the civilian thinkers who sought to
protect “natural rights” for all humankind (they abolished, inter
alia, slavery and torture),27 it was the common law nations that
were initially successful in putting this higher law into a practical

25. Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 33.
26. Id. at 51.
27. Lucke, supra note 9, at 17.
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form.28 Indeed, the monarchy was still quite strong in both Austria
and Prussia at the time of the drafting of the codes, but the
common law was invoked to limit the monarchy in England.29
Moreover, I do not intend to prove specific civilian/continental
influence on the Constitution or the American legal system as a
whole. Such a job has already been done. Much has already been
written on the subject of civilian theory and the framing
generation.30 Some have noted that, at times, the framers appealed
to civilian theory more often than to common law thinkers—even
Blackstone!31 Others have shown, through extensive research, that
the civil law was appealed to on private law matters that the
common law already covered,32 and in American law generally.33
Indeed, some of the most famous cases in common law property
were actually civil law based decisions.34 The use of civilian
theory was even stronger in the area of Constitutional
adjudication.35 Further still, others have inadvertently noted
statements by the framers which show vivid knowledge of the civil

28. Id. at 37, (explaining that the American Declaration of Independence
was recording these ideas while the Europeans were trying to put them into their
codes); common law courts also acted early in protecting certain rights against
one’s neighbors; Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of
American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 170 (1928-1929).
29. Corwin, supra note 28, at 183-85.
30. Some have set forth that the method of adjudication that was used in the
founding documents appears more civilian than common law-based—i.e.
looking for fundamental principles first, then applying them to the facts, rather
than deriving fundamental principles from the facts. See Jacques Vanderlinden,
Is the Pre-20th Century American Legal System a Common Law System? An
Exercise in Legal Taxonomy, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1 (2011).
31. Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 195
(1984).
32. R.H. Helmholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American
Jurisprudence in Symposium: Relationships Among Roman Law, Common Law,
and Modern Civil Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1649, 1679 (1992).
33. Id. at 1653.
34. Id. at 1664 (citing Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)).
35. Id. at 1671, 1676 (stating “The Constitution of the United States and
those of the several states were understood in the light of these civilian
statements of principle.”).

2015]

SECUNDUM CIVILIS

595

law, even going so far as to state that writing the Constitution
down would give it “a usufruct” over the next generation.36
Finally, I do not mean to deny any and all common law
influence on the Constitution. However, it is highly important to
note that the common law was not as sacrosanct to the framing
generation as the modern Supreme Court opinions would have us
believe. At times, many were openly hostile to the adoption of the
common law, and made sure that individuals knew they did not
adopt it simply by being under English control—and this was two
years before the colonies declared independence.37 Moreover,
others were concerned about the political structure that having
common law courts would bring, to wit it was noted, “To bring the
common law wholesale would bring ‘a thousand anti-republican
theories.’”38 Perhaps these hostilities were more directed at the
source of the common law rather than at the common law itself.
After all, we declared independence from, and fought a war
against, the English Monarchy. Is it any surprise that the people
would be somewhat put off by adopting a legal regime created by
Crown-appointed judges? In the generation following the framing,
it was succinctly put. “[W]e are not so strict as [England] in our
attachment to everything in the Common Law.”39 Finally, one
should take note that the drafters of the Constitution were not the
ones who actually gave it power. The people of the United States
gave it power. As a result, it was not Englishmen alone who

36. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1980) (citing, 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 116, 121 (P. Ford ed., 1895) (emphasis omitted from original).
37. Pound, supra note 5, at 6 (stating, “already in Novaglus (1774) John
Adams argued against the proposition that the colonists, of legal necessity, had
brought over English law with them and were bound by it . . .”).
38. KAMMEN, supra note 20, at 54 (citing letter from George Washington to
Alexander Hamilton, July 10, 1787).
39. Thomas H. Lee, The Civil Law Tradition in American Constitutionalism
(citing letter to Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell), Sep. 22, 1828, in 1 LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 559 (William Story ed., 1851)), available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Lee%20Civil%20
Law%20Tradition%20NYU%20Final%20Draft.pdf.
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ratified it,40 but a people consisting of mainly Continental
Europeans.41 This idea is reflected through Thomas Paine, who
once stated, “Europe, and not England, is the parent country of
America. Not one third of the inhabitants, even of this province
[Pennsylvania], are of English descent. Wherefore, I reprobate the
phrase of parent or mother country applied to England only as
being false, selfish, narrow and ungenerous.”42
However, one should also note that the framers adored the
common law when it protected individual rights, hence they often
invoked the “rights of Englishmen.”43 Moreover, to deny common
law influence entirely would be an absurd thing to do, as the
Seventh Amendment clearly cites the “common law.”44
D. Note on the Title
In searching for a title to this essay, I knew it must be (1) in
Latin to reflect the classical legal aspect of this paper, and (2) it
must reference both systems of law: common and civil. Eventually,
I came to realize that the selected title, Secundum Civilis, achieved
this end and also reiterated themes present throughout this writing.
Taken together the words may mean “through the civilians,”
“second city,” or “second civilian.” An astute observer would
realize that it also references two works of law that are
fundamentally important. The first part denotes what has become
known as the Corpus Juris Secundum, which is the total body of
40. As the Preamble of the United States Constitution states, “We the
people . . .”.
41. This achieved what Benjamin Franklin wanted, i.e., having a
Constitution which would be attractive to Continental Europeans. See Mitchell
Franklin, Concerning the Influence of Roman Law on the Formulation of the
Constitution of the United States, 38 TUL. L. REV. 621, 631 [hereinafter
Concerning the Influence].
42. Id. (citing Paine, Common Sense (1776) in 2 LIFE & WORKS OF THOMAS
PAINE 93, 127 (William Van der Weyde ed., 1925)).
43. Calvin Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment,
61 U. CIN. L. REV. 49, 56 (Giving examples of the early American invoking the
“rights of Englishmen”).
44. “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved….”
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law for the United States—a massive compilation of rules of law
and court decisions.45 The second part denotes the Corpus Juris
Civilis—the work of, inter alia, Tribonian at the order of Emperor
Justinian. The CJC, which will be discussed in detail below, served
as a source of Roman law for centuries.46 One would do well to
study it.
Lastly, the interpretation understood as “through the civilian”
represents a universal theory: law is meant to be understood by the
citizens.47 This need for citizen understanding of the law, I believe,
inevitably leads to the position that the citizenry ought to be at the
center of the law.48 Even those principles of law arising from
universal reason were understood as needing to be morphed in
such a way as to be usable by the average person.49 All four
Enlightenment era codes share such a belief. Thus, the title drives
home the very heart of this essay—the Constitution is, in all
essential respects, an Enlightenment code and ought to be
understood as one.
II. ARTICLE I: THE ROMAN LAW
A. The Roman Law and Europe
What is meant by the term “Roman law” is not a single set of
statutes or juristic writers, but rather a broad spectrum of law
ranging from the sixth century B.C. through Cicero, Theodosius,
45. It is in the context of the CJS, the term “Secundum” denotes the second
edition. Kendall F. Svengalis, Legal Encyclopedias in LEGAL INFORMATION
BUYER'S GUIDE & REFERENCE MANUAL 89-90 (Rhode Island Law Press 2010).
46. Zepos, supra note 6, at 897 (stating, “the root of that common European
Spirit lies in the Roman world-empire, the final phase of which is represented by
the Justinian legislation in the form it took in the sixth century.”).
47. The Constitution is meant to be understood by the voters, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576; 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008); Others
have noted that the Civil Codes are meant to be understood by the citizens.
WATSON, supra note 14, at 142.
48. Professor Moréteau also believes that citizens should be the center of
the “legal universe,” Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 34.
49. Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 655 (discussing how the drafters morphed
the theoretical into the practical).
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and the classical Roman age, then deposited, for the most part,
within the confines of the Corpus Juris Civilis and protected by the
Holy Church for a millennium. It is this body of law that has been
picked apart throughout multiple eras of human kind and
transplanted into the existing social order. Due to its significance
in our discussion, a brief history of the Roman law follows, along
with an explanation of how it entered the great codes and
ultimately the United States Constitution.
Out of historical necessity, we begin with the Law of the
Twelve Tables; indeed, no discussion of legal antiquity could be
complete without it.50 After the monarchy was eliminated and
Rome became a fledgling republic, two classes of people existed—
patricians (noble-born) and plebeians (essentially, commoners).
When a dispute arose between citizens, and the law was not clearly
on one side or the other, resort was made to the pontiffs, who were
all patricians. Needless to say, the plebeians did not always receive
a fair hearing. To resolve the deep mistrust of the plebeians, a
group of ten citizens, decemviri, were assigned to draft the Twelve
Tables, which were to extend over all areas of possible contention
among citizens. Ostensibly, this allowed the plebeians to know
their rights before they entered court.51 One can see in this concept
the shaping of the theory that law is meant for the citizens.
As Rome expanded, the need for new legal devices also grew.
To alleviate this growing need, pontiffs were able to creatively
interpret the Twelve Tables via analogy to other provisions therein
to cover situations not historically provided for. One such event
concerned emancipation.52 The Twelve Tables had the father as
head of the household, who held control over his family until
death. Another provision allowed a father to sell his son into
50. Id. at 645, n. 1&2 (noting that the history of Roman law is said to have
started with the law of the Twelve Tables) (citing Reginald Parker, The Criteria
of the Civil Law, 7 JURIST 140 (1947) and FRITZ SCHULZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN
LEGAL SCIENCE 5 (1946)).
51. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 3-4.
52. Id. 7-9.
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servitude, but if he sold him three times, then the son became
liberated and was no longer under his father’s control. This gave us
emancipation, for a father could “sell” his son into servitude three
times, each time having a friend “return” his son. Thus, the son
would be freed from his father’s house. Eventually, this concept of
emancipation was expanded to female children as well. One can
see in this that the origins of text are only interpretation.
When the republic expanded well beyond Italy, it began having
more contact with non-Roman citizens than it ever had before. As
such, a new, separate law was created for them—ius gentium,
meaning the law common to all civilizations.53 That which covered
Roman citizens was called the ius civil. This need to have separate
laws—and separate praetors for each—would come to an end
during the classical Roman period, when essentially all residents of
the empire were made citizens.54
Finally, we reach the Christian era. During the first two
centuries of Christianity, the Roman republic saw its most
prominent legal age yet. Four members of this class deserve
special attention, as their work and ideas will constantly arise in
our discussion, and constantly arise in any discussion on Roman
law. The first is the great teacher of Roman law, Gaius. He was the
one who divided the civil law in his textbook, The Institutes, into
three concepts: persons, things, and actions.55 Then there is Ulpian
and Paul, both of whom are still highly regarded today for their
ability to synthesize jurisprudence. And finally, there is Papinian,
who is beloved for his case analysis.

53. Id. 12-13; see also Anton-Hermann Chroust, Ius Gentium in the
Philosophy of Law of St. Thomas Aquinas, 12 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 22, 26
(1941) (stating that ius genitum is “that law which natural reason alone has set
up among men” or “that law which all peoples make use of.”).
54. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that the Constitutio
Antoniana stretched Roman citizenship far beyond its former bounds).
55. For a more thorough discussion of Roman legal history, and on Gaius in
particular, see ANDREW STEPHENSON, A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN LAW WITH A
COMMENTARY ON THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS & JUSTINIAN (1912).
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The next phase of Roman legal history came with the Codex
Theodosius, which was said to be a compilation of all laws created
by the Christian Emperors since Constantine’s religious conversion
of the empire. However grand this work may be on its own, it pales
in comparison to that of a later emperor, Justinian.
Justinian, Emperor of the Eastern Empire in Constantinople,
looked at the desolation of the West after the German invaders
conquered the once great civilization. While at the same time
attempting to wrestle authority away from the Roman Papacy, he
wanted to restore the magnificence of a unified Empire.56 His
conquests eventually let him hold Italy for a brief period. But his
conquests on land would not be his lasting legacy. Like Napoléon
after him, Justinian’s memory would be preserved more by his
legal writing than by his military conduct. In the sixth century,
Justinian appointed a council to combine all the laws of the Empire
into one massive volume. Headed by Tribonian, the council made
quick work of their task. In the end, the work was divided into
three parts: the first is the Institutes, modeled after that of Gaius;
the second is the Digest, a compilation of writings by great jurists
such as Paul, Ulpian, and Papinian; the third is the Code, modeled
after that of Theodosius. Justinian eventually had to add a fourth
part, called the Novels, a compilation of his own enactments.
Massive in size and importance, the document is one and a half
times the size of the Bible, and lasted as the basis of law for
Romans in Byzantium until the Muslim conquest in 1453.57
But in the west, the CJC was lost in the sixth century. It would
not be rediscovered until more than four hundred years later. This
does not mean that Roman law was entirely lost for that lengthy
period. The conquerors adopted some provisions of Roman law
and traces of it can be seen in the Visigoth Code. Moreover, the
56. Stein, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 32-35 (noting his desire to restore
the glory of the old Roman Empire).
57. Id. (noting the massive size and complexity); see also Zepos, supra note
6, at 899 (noting that the Muslim conquerors allowed Roman law to continue as
a basis for enslaved Christians).
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Catholic Church, being the only Roman institution left in the West
after the fall, helped to preserve many Roman legal customs, most
notably by the use of its ecclesiastical courts.
After its rediscovery in Italy, the CJC gave rebirth to the study
of Roman law. Students from throughout the continent came to
study it. During this frenzy a number of different groups developed
inter alia, the commentators and glossators—who sought to
explain the text. Eventually the glosses were given their own
books. In time, some sought to defend Roman law on the basis of a
higher law; others used it as a supplement to their own laws; and it
became a corner stone in the ecclesiastical courts, which gave it
almost universal application in Europe. It was studied to some
degree in England, until those who tried to teach it were exiled.
Roman law was to have its greatest impact when it filled the void
left by the Catholic Church following the Reformation. After those
unfortunately volatile years, a universal system of law seemed
impossible. But the respect many had for the Roman custom
allowed it to continue crossing international borders, including
those of France, Prussia, Austria, and, eventually, to the United
States.58
B. The Prussian Code
Most people are familiar with the saying, “all roads lead to
Rome.” This section of the essay may be construed as implying,
“all codes lead to Rome.” Indeed, that body of law, as has been
noted above, played a pivotal role in the formation of the civil law,
and it is the adoption of the same that gives the civil law, and the
codes of the Enlightenment, a unique spirit.59 Given the extreme

58. For a more thorough discussion on Roman legal history, see CHARLES
PHINEAS SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD (1917) and PETER
STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW (1988)
[hereinafter CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE].
59. WATSON, supra note 14, at 1-22 (noting that one of the main
characteristics of the civil law and of the Codes is the basis of Roman law;
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importance of each code in laying the criteria for what is an
“Enlightenment code,” it is necessary to show how these codes
came to be, for it is by the similar political and social processes
that created them that one may compare them to the United States
Constitution; this is especially true with Roman law.60
Therefore, we begin with the Prussian Civil Code. In German,
its name is Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten
(ALR), and it was initially begun under the leadership of Frederick
the Great.61 But did not come into force until his son, Frederick II,
came to power in 1794. It is said to have dealt with what we call
today constitutional law,62 civil law, and criminal law.
When Frederick William I first sought to adopt a code for his
scattered kingdom in 1714, he looked to the faculty of law at the
University of Halle, led by Christian Thomasius. His goals were
not reached. But a little more than two decades later, he arranged
for Samuel von Cocceji to draft a new law. It is said that unlike
Thomasius, Cocceji was “a keen Romanist [who] tried to maintain
the primacy of Roman law.”63 The kingdom was against him,
though, on this point.
Part of the reason why the code took so long to be drafted was
due to Roman law. Initially, the King wanted to remove the
“Roman law which [was] written in Latin and compiled without
any order or system.”64 This dream, however, was not realized, as
the bulk of the draft simply rearranged what had become the ius

Roman law is essentially the intellectual basis of the civil law and of the Civil
Codes).
60. Others have given blanket statements as to the effect of Roman law on
the great codes. See Zepos, supra note 6, at 903 (noting particular characteristics
of the great codes showing Roman law influences).
61. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 112; Lucke, supra note 9, at 1324.
62. Pt. II, tit. 13, giving legislative authority, power to lay taxes, and power
to levy war; Pt. II, tit. 17, § 18 dispenses judicial power; § 44 gives sovereign
immunity, abrogated only by consent.
63. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 112.
64. Lucke, supra note 9, at 18.

2015]

SECUNDUM CIVILIS

603

commune—Roman law changed to fit into each nation. Indeed, by
the time the whole matter was settled, Roman law was to be
included where it fit in with everything else.
One needs not look to the subtext of the code to find Roman
influences. In Section 30 of the introduction to an earlier draft of
the code it is stated that the King has not abolished Roman law, but
has taken out the confusion so that, “consequently, the Roman law
is reduced into an art and system; that is to say, it is proposed in
the most natural and proper order….” Moreover, Part I, Book I,
Title I, Section 10 of that same draft states, “We have indeed taken
the Roman law for a foundation, in so far as its general principles
appear to be drawn from natural reason.” The specific intuitions of
Roman law taken up in the code may be seen in those provisions
on property.65 Though highly specific, this code managed to last
until the Code of the German Empire of 1900.
C. The Austrian Code
Much like the other Codes discussed within this essay, the
Austrian Code had a tumultuous gestation period. Holy Roman
Emperor Charles VI wanted a comprehensive law of intestate
succession based upon Justinian’s laws (in force from 1727 to
1747).66 His successor to the empire, Maria Teresa, issued an order
in 1753 to draft a code, which was to cover all of private law (as
opposed to the Prussian code, which wanted to also cover public
law). This Codex Theresianus was finished in 1766, and was a
compromise of Roman law and customary law. Although written
in the vernacular, the code spanned 8,367 articles and was grouped
based on Roman law categories. This code was met with fierce
public opposition as it removed too much power from the nobles,
and was viewed by reformers as not being drastic enough.
65. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 112. Such a fact is not surprising,
since Roman law has been called “a prolific parent of codes.” Edgar S.
Shumway, Justinian’s Redaction, 49 AM. L. REG. 195, 197 (1901).
66. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 112.
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A student of the great natural law thinker Martini, a man by the
name of Johann Bernhard Horten, was hired to draft a new, shorter
code. The code under the new emperor, Joseph II, went into force
in 1787. The work of the previous commission was then thrown
out and a new commission was ordered. This time, Martini was
placed at its head (as he had been for the first draft of the Codex
Theresianus). The code was eventually given actual force in 1811,
some sixty years after the Codex was begun.
But Martini’s effect upon the Code is felt in both Natural law
and Roman law. For it is by his natural law work that the Roman
law was allowed into both his code and the later final drafts.67 He
argued that Roman law was not bad, but was indeed reasonable:
“Roman civil law consists to the greatest extent of natural laws. It
is impossible to avoid all error if its shortcomings are complements
according to the precepts of natural law and its dark passages
illuminated.”68 One may see the primary effect of Roman law in
this code in the notion that the private civil law made no distinction
of social or economic status between freemen. One may also see
the Roman law influence on the notion of suretyship.69
In the end, Franz von Zeiller replaced Martini as head of the
commission on drafting. His work is said to be a practical
compromise between Roman law and the contemporary law. This
shortened draft (1,502 articles) has remained in force to the present
day, with some amendments occurring in 1914, 1915, and 1916
and was given the name of Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch—
ABGB).70 One may view the document as a testament to the
longevity and universality of both the Roman law and of the codes.

67. Id. at 113 (stating, “Thus, although Roman law as such was rejected,
certain ideas of Roman law could be brought back under guise of natural law.”).
68. Id.
69. Philip K. Jones, Jr., Roman Law Bases of Suretyship in Some Modern
Civil Codes, 52 TUL. L. REV. 129, 148 (1977-1978) (noting that the Roman
conception of suretyship was adopted into the Austrian Civil Code).
70. Id. at 114 (noting its longevity).
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D. The Code Civil
Aside from the United States Constitution, few legal
documents have ever had the global impact of the Napoleonic
Code. Its theories and order were followed by codifiers in
Louisiana,71 Italy, Latin America, and Canada (to name only a
few)—not to mention throughout central Europe as a consequence
of Napoleon’s wars.
Codification as such was nothing new in France. Indeed,
centuries prior to the Revolution, King Charles VII had ordered
that the customs of France be written down, which resulted in a
codified and uncodified system. After the Revolution, however, the
need for a comprehensive code on private law was more than
obvious. The Revolutionary government had continuously
promised such, but it had always failed to deliver it. In fact, the
first three drafts of the code, written by Jean-Jacques Régis de
Cambacérès, were all rejected for one reason or another.
However, when Napoléon became first consul, he envisioned a
code covering all private law, and wanted it completed quickly and
perfectly. To achieve this end, he appointed Jean Étienne Portalis
and three jurists to head the Commission of 1800. To be sure, the
prior attempts at codification were very useful to their endeavors.
Moreover, the Commission was able to look to eighteenth century
writers such as Domat and Pothier, and quoted them frequently.
In this manner Roman law was able to influence the French
code. Both Domat and Pothier summarized the law that was in
force in France at that time, which was itself heavily Roman. Even
more importantly, Pothier had already done much of the primary
work needed to draft a code. He had collected and organized the
Roman law into a “rational and usable order,”72 and then divided
the generally applicable laws gleaned from there into five
71. The Digest of 1808 was the first in a long list of civil codes inspired by
the French model.
72. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 114.
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categories: general rules, persons, things, actions, and public law.
The rules on public law were left out of the Code civil. But Pothier
was not solely a Roman scholar. He was also very familiar with
French customary law, and was able to weave Roman law and
custom together.
It is said that the Roman rules of law predominate the Code
civil,73 which is still in force (with some amendments) today. One
example of Roman private law can be seen in the notion of lesion:
in article 1118, lesion vitiates certain kinds of contracts; then
article 1674 allows parties with full legal capacity to gain
rescission of a contract where he has been injured by selling his
property for less than seven-twelfths of the value of his immovable
property. Moreover, the concept of good faith, which can be seen
in all three of the great codes, stems from the Roman law of bona
fides.74 So, too, is the concept of favoring the debtor over the
creditor derived from the Roman rule of wanting to protect the
weak from the strong. Lastly, the distinctions between ownership
and possession in the codes were, and continue to be in all civilian
states, the Roman rule.75

73. Others have noted the massive influence of Roman Law on the Code
civil. See J.L. HALPERIN, THE CIVIL CODE 69 (David Gruning trans., 2001)
(stating, “Roman law was also invoked as the source for the Code’s rules on
successions and property.”). See also Olivier Moréteau, Recodification in
Louisiana and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1146 (2008-2009) (noting
the “radical unity of the European law that found its grounding in Roman law.”).
74. See WATSON, supra note 14, at 166 (noting the Roman lesion concept in
the codes). See Zepos, supra note 6, at 904 (noting that it is from this notion that
the concept of abuse of right is derived. This rule of law is present in all civilian
jurisdictions even where no provision for it exists.).
75. To be fair, several provisions of the codes do not derive from the
Roman rules directly and are, in fact, responses to the Roman understanding.
See Zepos, supra note 6, at 903-904.
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E. The Roman Law and the United States Constitution76
The framing generation had a wealth of sources pertaining to
the Roman law.77 This included, inter alia, numerous copies of
Justinian’s legal temple, the Corpus Juris Civilis—both translated
into English and retained in Latin. They were taught in the
classical style, and knew a great deal about Roman public law and
its history.78 It is indisputable that the same people who declared
independence and drafted the American Constitution at
Philadelphia both admired, to the point of nearly worshiping, the
ancient republic, and wished to learn from its mistakes.79 Their
professors were civilians, their friends across the pond were
civilians; and these civilians were all trained in the Roman law.80
With this brief interlude in mind, we continue forth with
ascertaining just how the late republic touched out national code.
1. Article I, Sections 1 & 3
What may at first seem to be a superficial connection to
antiquity, may also be the most profound Roman influence on the
76. This section of the essay owes a substantial debt to Professor Mitchel
Franklin of Tulane. Without his early study in the area of Roman law influences
on the Constitution, I doubt I would have been able to have completed this
essay.
77. It has also been noted that there was a “propaganda campaign” to
establish the civil law in America. Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in
Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REV. 403 (1966) (cited in STEIN,
CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE, supra note 58, at 413). Others have also noted this
general civil law influence in the early United States. See Pound, supra note 5.
78. Richard M. Gummere, The Classical Ancestry of the United States
Constitution, 14 AM. Q. 4-6 (1962) (noting that Jefferson was busy shipping
ancient Roman law sources and contemporary Romanist writings by Mably to
the delegates, also noting that Adams was said to have “thought in Latin;” and
“Cicero’s ideas on [some subjects] run like a stream underground through our
colonial writings.” See also David J. Bederman, The Classical Constitution:
Roman Republic Origins of The Habeas Suspension Clause, 17 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 405, 407 (2007-2008).
79. R.H. Helmholz, supra note 32. See also DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE,
JUSTINIAN IN BRAINTREE: JOHN ADAMS, CIVILIAN LEARNING, AND LEGAL
ELITISM, 1758-1775 (Colonial Soc. of Mass. 1984) (noting that Cicero has been
called “a role model for early American lawyers” and calling John Adams a
“barnyard Justinian.”).
80. Stein, supra note 77.
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Constitution. It is well established that the framers looked to the
Roman notion of public power as a guide as to how the same
power ought to be handled.81 Indeed, perhaps one of the most
famous comments to come from Rome seems to be reflected in our
triune federal structure. In discussing the separation of
governmental power into three parts, Polybius writes:
For when one part having grown out of proportion to the
others aims at supremacy and tends to become too
predominate, it is evident that, as for the reasons above
given none of the three is absolute, but the purpose of the
one can be counterworked and thwarted by the others, none
of them will excessively outgrow the others or treat them
with contempt. 82
Besides this separation of powers there is yet another structural
connection to the ancient regime. It is this structural feature that
bears a more pronounced Roman influence than the three-part
separation of power. That feature is, of course, the Senate. Article
I, Section 1 creates the Senate: “All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Section 3
further delineates the powers and functions of the body. Of
particular note are a higher age requirement, a longer term, and a
larger constituency than the House.
As any student of history should know this separation of
legislative power was the result of the Great Compromise. Some
delegates wished to have Congressional representation based upon
statehood, and thus a set number of representatives per state.
Others wanted Congressional representation to be based upon
population. The solution to this crisis: split the difference. Thus,
the bicameral legislature was born in the United States.
81. See generally Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Federalist Lessons of Rome, 75
MISS. L.J. 431 (2005-2006) (The author outlines Roman law influences on
multiple provisions of the federalist papers. Due to the constraints of this essay,
I have been unable to address the full influence here. Thus I refer the reader to
this most excellent work on the subject).
82. Cited in Bederman, supra note 78, at 416.
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The body, as it exists in this nation, is undoubtedly based on
the Roman constitutional scheme. The term “Senate” derives from
the Latin Senatus, which means “council of elders.” If the framing
generation had not wanted to base its conception upon the Roman
system, it could have named the body anything else. Examples of
such are “upper house” or “chamber.” Moreover, the type of
reverence for this body, as opposed to other contemporary
legislatures, is almost identical. The Romans looked to their
council as a higher office; its members were allowed to wear
purple sashes and make binding legislation. The same body has
been charged with being “made up of the wisest, the best educated,
the most respected, most experienced, most vigilant, most patriotic
men of substance in the Roman republic.”83 In much the same way,
it is well known that the American Senate was designed to be more
prestigious and deliberative than the House of Representatives.
2. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2
The Constitution provides in this section, “The privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.”84
In reviewing ancient influences on the American Constitution, it
has been explained that, “[a] Roman citizen’s right of provocatio,
coupled with the tribunitial power of auxilium, was an ancient
analogue of habeas corpus. Additionally, the exigent circumstances
for the suspension of habeas corpus closely mirror those for the
derogation of provocatio and auxilium.”85 Although one may see
correlation to the British model of habeas corpus, one should also
realize that there exists a concept of habeas corpus that is not the
sole concept of the clause at issue. Rather, it also provides under
what circumstances the writ may be suspended. This method is in
83. ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC ON THE
HISTORY OF ROMAN CONSTITUTIONALISM at ix, xi (1995).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
85. Bederman, supra note 78, at 439.
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stark contrast to the way the writ was suspended by the English.
On that point, it has been noted, “[i]t is important to realize,
however, that British law was rather less helpful to the Framing
Generation in explaining the specific conditions or timing for the
suspensions of habeas corpus.”86 The English version was “less
helpful” because the Parliament suspended habeas corpus only
against a “limited class of persons declared to be treasonous or in
rebellion against the Crown and were essentially bills of attainder,
a form of legislation proscribed by the United States
Constitution.”87
If the item known as the “suspension clause” were to be
thought of as referring to the British model of habeas corpus, then
it would simply mean “bills of attainder.” But if the term
contemplates bills of attainder, then we would be forced into a
terrible position—the Constitution would have superfluity. For if
the habeas corpus clause means “bills of attainder,” then the clause
that follows the suspension clause is superfluous. For that clause
states, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”88 The only way to avoid this superfluity is to suggest that
the second clause overrules the first, but seeing that they were
passed at the same time, this seems highly unlikely.
Lastly, it should be mentioned that throughout the ratifying era,
in the State conventions, and in the Philadelphia convention,
extensive attention was paid to the Roman republican use of
temporary dictators in times of emergency.89 When these dictators
were declared, periods of time were set for the suspension of the
aforementioned provocatio and auxilium.90 Thus, the ratifying
states certainly contemplated the clause as referring to the Roman
legal concept. But one must be aware that both clauses are in the
portion of the Constitution placing limits on Congressional power.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
Bederman, supra note 78, at 439-40.
Id. at 436.
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Thus, the Roman influence is not only one of giving an example of
a necessary power, but in giving a lesson of what ought not be
done. A student of history would recall that the last Roman dictator
never gave up power.
3. Article IV, Section 4
The Constitution states, “The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of
the Legislature, or if the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic violence.”91 Few scholars have
expounded on this text and courts have essentially overlooked it.
And the American people have forgotten its meaning over time.
But this section suggests something rather amazing. If it had been
understood in a Roman law light, then: (1) The fourteenth
amendment could have been accomplished by legislation, and (2)
much of what was accomplished by an expanded commerce power
could have been achieved by a Romanist-construed Guarantee
clause. But those specific results are beyond the scope of this
section of my essay. They will, however, be alluded to in what
follows.
There was, in Roman public law, a concept of intercessio,
whereby the plebeian tribunes could agree or veto acts passed by
the patricians, when those actions had effect upon the plebeians.92
The main historical connection to the Roman doctrine can be found
91. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
92. The history of this power is much more complicated than I have made it
here. A full discussion of Roman intercession is left for another time. However,
one may note that the power of intercession is not confined to acts by the
Congress; judicial review of State actions also bears a striking burden to the
concept. Moreover, Professor Franklin has been able to connect the same
principle discussed herein, intercession, and apply it to the veto power implicit
within the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mitchell Franklin, Problems Relating to
the Influence of the Roman Idea of the Veto Power in the History of Law, 22
TUL. L. REV. 443 (1947-1948). Since this paper primarily concerns the
Philadelphia Constitution and the original ten amendments, I have refrained
from discussing that point.
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in writings between the French Romanist, Abbé de Mably, who
was a very dear friend of both Adams and Jefferson, and whose
works were read by Benjamin Franklin. On the issue of
intercession against the States, Mably wrote to Adams:
With you, the authority of the Congress must supply the
place of triunes, provided you give to this assembly the
form and credit which it ought to hold. The rich, when they
perceived a body empowered to sit in judgment upon their
actions, would prove guarded in their enterprises; and the
people would, certainly, feel less disquiet and suspicious….
[E]ither the hope of fear of a juridical decision would calm
the raging of sedition in America.93
Thus, it is said that Mably “gave the Continental Congress the
power
of
interposition
against
anti-democratic
state
94
governments.” Madison apparently took up this idea and, in
Federalist Paper 43, described it as creating the power of
“interposition of the general government.” That this intercessio
was taken from Mably and ordered upon the United States
Constitution is further shown by Madison’ writings to Jefferson.
There Madison reveals his worries about state power in saying, “a
check on the States appears to me necessary . . . . Without such a
check in the whole over the parts, our system involves the evil of
imperia in imperio.”95
In discovering this connection, Professor Franklin noted:
In suggesting that the national government was capable of
objective judgment concerning the genuineness of the
republicanism of the states, Madison was following Mably.
As has been shown [Mably] had proposed to John Adams
that the Romanist interpositional or tribunitional power [as
was named above as intercession] be given exclusively to
the Continental Congress, because it would exercise its
authority in accordance with legal method.96

93.
94.
95.
96.

Franklin, Concerning the Influence, supra note 41, at 628.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 633-34.
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To further drive home the Roman law influence on this portion
of the Constitution, it is interesting to note that the Guarantee
clause may have no English origin.97
It is a sad gloss on history that the Southern States used
“interposition” to protect their racist proclivities for decades, while
the true power of interposition actually rested in the hands of the
federal Congress.
4. The Fifth Amendment and Infamy
The Constitution provides that “No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crimes . . . nor be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”98
The understanding of that clause, today, is that a person cannot be
forced to testify against himself on any matter that may eventually
lead him to criminal liability. However, when this clause is
understood in light of its Roman origin, it actually means that a
person cannot be forced to testify at all in a criminal trial, when
doing so may “infame” him.
Infamy stems from Roman feudal infamy.99 This concept
essentially causes a person to be ostracized by the community. The
person, whether or not convicted of a crime or found liable for
some action, could be deemed “civilly unworthy,” dishonored, or
disgraced. The general term for this concept when translated into
English is “infamy.”100 From Rome, the concept was carried over
into feudal Europe, under the guise of religious
infamy/excommunication. John Calvin kept infamy/excommunication after Luther attempted to abolish it. The Puritans carried the
concept with them to the New World, until it was abolished by
popular demand as being “undemocratic.” Montesquieu wrote
97. Id. at 628-29.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99. See generally Franklin, The Encyclopédiste, supra note 3. The following
is a summary of Professor Franklin’s findings on the subject.
100. Id. at 42 (explaining that there are some thirty-two other ways of stating
infamy).
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about infamy as being one of the most ruinous things that could
happen to a person.101 A French Encyclopédisme idol, Cesare
Beccaria,102 helped to develop and secularize Luther’s attack on
infamy. Jefferson and Edward Livingston are both known to have
studied Beccaria in detail. It is from these men and their roles in
the founding generation that infamy was brought into the Fifth
Amendment.103
Because informing, or testifying against one’s neighbors and
friends, may create just the type of infamy that was present in
feudal Europe and ancient Rome, the Fifth Amendment must
necessarily be understood as a right of any witness to refrain from
testifying, even if it would not incriminate him for the crime
charged or any future charges. Thus, self-incrimination should
properly be understood as “self-infamy.” A dissenting Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this point.104
It is important to note that the concept of “infamy” mentioned
in the Constitution, “[never] enjoy[ed] any real important role as
such in [the] history of English Criminal law, perhaps because it
was excluded or held down by Magna Carta.”105 Therefore, the

101. Id. at 43 (quoting Montesquieu as saying, “the hopelessness of infamy
causes torment to a Frenchman condemned to a punishment which would not
deprive a Turk of a quarter of our sleep.”).
102. Beccaria himself was Italian, but his work on the philosophy of crime
became world-famous, was read throughout Europe, and made its way to the
United States. Richard V. Sipe, Cesare Beccaria, 22 IND. L.J. 29, 38 (19461947).
103. Franklin also shows how such an understanding would exclude
“presidential and congressional infamy, such [as had] developed in the United
States since the ending of the Second World War.” Id. at 44.
104. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 450; 76 S. Ct. 497, 513 (1956)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). That the Supreme Court would cite to the Roman law
is of no surprise. After all, there have been literally hundreds of Supreme Court
cases that have made mention of or relied upon Roman law. See Samuel J.
Astorino, Roman Law in American Law: Twentieth Century Cases of the
Supreme Court, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 633 (2001-2002).
105. Franklin, The Encyclopédiste, supra note 3. I would also note that this is
another example of the common law system moving more toward human rights
protection than the civil law system. By this statement, it is shown, that infamy
was excluded from public life much sooner in England than on the continent.
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most potent source of “infamy” is that which stems from the
Roman law and not any that is present in the English law.
5. The Fifth Amendment and Double Jeopardy
On this point the Fifth Amendment declares, “nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb.”106 Popularly called the Double Jeopardy clause,
the Roman roots of this clause have long been established. In
Justice Black’s dissent in Bartkus v. Illinois,107 it was stated, “Fear
and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the
same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in Western
civilization. Its roots run deep into Greek and Roman times.”108 To
prove this point, the Justice makes reference to Justinian’s Digest,
which states, as translated by Scott, “The governor should not
permit the same person to be again accused of a crime of which he
has been acquitted.”109
But Justice Black is not alone in finding the source of double
jeopardy in antiquity. The same connection was made by Professor
Paul Baier of LSU, who upon finding the connection stated,
“[w]ho would have thought that certain of our Constitutional
protections have come down to us from Rome?”110 Indeed, even
other clauses, such as the right of confrontation expressed in the
Sixth Amendment111 have roots in Roman legal practice.112
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. 359 U.S. 121; 79 S. Ct. 673 (1959).
108. Id. at 151-52.
109. Id. at 152, n. 3 (citing to DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 48.2.7.2).
110. Paul Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian and Antonin Scalia: Twenty
Years in Retrospect, 67 LA. L. REV. 494 (2007). Professor Baier also noted
several other provisions of the United States Constitution which appear to have
been lifted wholesale from the Roman text, and applied to the practical
situations facing the framers. Among these are: the ex post facto prohibition in
art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and the rule against the impairing the obligation of contracts
found in art. I, § 10. Id.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to…be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
112. THOMAS JAMES NORTON, 1 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
ITS SOURCES AND ITS APPLICATION 219 (1962).
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6. The Ninth Amendment and the Roman Legal Method
As one will come to know upon completion of this essay, I
believe that the Ninth Amendment ought to be considered the most
robust Amendment of them all.113 Indeed, I believe that it (1)
orders that the Roman method of analogical reasoning be used to
interpret the Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights; (2) houses
the natural law of the Enlightenment; and (3) should bring under
its umbrella almost the entirety of substantive due process, while
incorporating all that against the states, not via the Due Process
clause, but via the Privileges or Immunities clause. However, this
section of the essay aims only to show how the Roman legal
method can be seen in the Ninth Amendment.
To briefly summarize the argument, the Ninth Amendment
declares, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”114 The most important fact about this Amendment is that
it says “the Constitution.” It does not say “these last eight
Amendments.” Thus, it refers to every right listed in the
Constitution. Moreover, one must read this clause from the
negative to see its ordering of the Roman method. Because we are
not allowed to use the listing of rights to deny any unwritten rights,
we must use the listing to discover these unwritten rights protected
by the Ninth Amendment.
The Civilian legal method is laid out in detail in the Louisiana
Civil Code.115 Moreover, when there is a problem that is
113. I am not alone in believing that the Ninth was meant to serve multiple
purposes. See Massey, supra note 43, at 50.
114. U. S. CONST. amend. IX.
115. Those articles read as follows:
Article 4: When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from
legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity.
To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing
usages.
. . . Article 9: When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application
does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as
written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the
intent of the legislature.
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“historically novel,”116 the Roman method orders that one make
analogy, not to prior cases to develop the law, but to other
provisions of the law. This method is usually summarized as “audelà du Code civil mais par le Code civil.”117 This is the opposite
of the common law method, which has at its helm the development
of law by analogical reasoning from prior cases. An example of
this can be seen above with the note on Roman emancipation.
Essentially, this method locates multiple provisions of the written
law, discovers their principles, and fashions a new rule implicit
therefrom. I am not the first person to notice that the Ninth
Amendment requires the civilian method be used in interpreting
the Constitution.118 Indeed, the Supreme Court has used it even as
late as the twentieth century.119

Article 10: When the language of the law is susceptible of different
meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best
conforms to the purpose of the law.
Article 11: The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing
meaning.
Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning
when the law involves a technical matter.
Article 12: When the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning
must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the
text of the law as a whole.
Article 13: Laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in
reference to each other.
116. Mitchell Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its
Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut;
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REV. 487-88 (1965-1966) [hereinafter
The Ninth Amendment].
117. Raymond Saleilles, Preface to FRANÇOIS GENY, SCIENCE ET
TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (1913). (“Beyond the Civil Code,
but through the Civil Code.” This is essentially the method that was used by
Justice Goldberg in discussing the Ninth Amendment in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965)).
118. Franklin, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 116.
119. Id. (Generally discussing this method as used in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965)).
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III. ARTICLE II: THE NATURAL LAW120
There are few concepts that have caused as much debate and
misunderstanding as natural law.121 It has, as Aristotle suggested,
been appealed to when one had no chance with the law of the
land.122 It has been argued as the basis for adopting the Roman
law,123 and has been supported on the notion of law originating
from the Bible. As such, it has gone by many names: The law of
nature, the law of God, the natural law, the law of reason. Its
existence or non-existence would either mean that positive law was
subordinate to another law, not crafted by human hands; or,
provided it doesn’t exist, would lead human beings to a sort of
legal nihilism known as “positivism.” Grounds for locating its
principles have been argued on both an ontological and
teleological basis—often arriving at the same conclusion. Others
dismiss it as merely looking up into the clouds and discovering an
answer.124
However, by the time it appeared in the American Constitution,
natural law had taken on a whole new model completely separate
from its theological roots, although owing a great deal to the
same.125 The Enlightenment had secularized it and changed the
focus from “natural law” to “natural rights.”126 Although in
Catholic Spain, the idea of natural law still had not yet taken on the
“individualist” approach of the other European states. Moreover,
120. For a more thorough discussion on the natural law, see JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
121. Massey, supra note 43.
122. Corwin, supra note 28, at 154. This quote is perhaps second in fame
only to “Law is reason, free from passion.”
123. See text accompanying note 60.
124. Or, as some have erroneously put it, “you can invoke natural law to
support anything you want.” ELY, supra note 36, at 50.
125. Kirk A. Kennedy, Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice
Clarence Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33, 41 (1997) (discussing natural law in
the context of law of reason and religion); see also Corwin, supra note 28, at
153 (discussing natural law as being from God); see also Lucke, supra note 9, at
10 (noting the transformation of the religious law of nature to the secular
version).
126. Lucke, supra note 9, at 10.
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the concept of natural law as obtained in England by that point was
not the same theory as what was coming of age on the continent.127
In England, the theory of natural law in the common law was not
“universal reason” but “artificial reason.”128 However, in practice,
one could see that these two concepts were ultimately arriving at
similar conclusions. Therefore, we will not take pains to separate
which concepts derived from which place, because ultimately they
are the same thing—a law higher than mere positive legislation.
A. The Natural Law and the Code of Prussia
The Prussian Code may well be called a “constitution for civil
society,”129 whose drafters saw no “insurmountable contradiction
between positive law and natural law.”130 Indeed, they brought
them together under one roof in a way that could scarcely be
imagined today: a world where legal positivism apparently rules
and natural law gets laughed at.131 But at the time of the Prussian
Code’s debate and existence, natural law was considered to be the
one true law, a law that no one dared to laugh at.

127. Pound, supra note 5, at 4-5.
128. Mitchell Franklin, A Study of Interpretation in the Civil Law, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 557 (1949-1950). I do not mean “artificial” as in fake. I mean artificial
in the since that the reason upon which this law is based—although influenced
by the natural law—is largely built up by experience. This is in contrast to what
is thought of in the continental “natural law” theory that law is “universal.” In
that vein, the natural lawyers decipher a rule of law from “reason” and apply it
to the circumstance in which it must do its work. An astute observer would note
that this is very similar to what St. Thomas Aquinas believed as to how the
natural law was to operate—finding a fundamental principle and then apply it to
its particular setting. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I of the
Second Part, Question XCV, art. 2 (comparing how the natural law is applied to
particular situations in the same manner that the form of a house is applied to a
particular construct of a house).
129. Glenn, supra note 5, at 769.
130. Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 655.
131. Although, many have suggested that natural law is making a comeback
and will soon be welcomed with thunderous applause. See Thurston Howard
Reynolds II, Natural Law Jurisprudence of the Sermon of the Law, 31 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 231 (2005) (stating, “Lately, Natural law seems to be regaining its
rightful place of preeminence . . .”).
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The influence of natural law on the Prussian Code can be seen
in both its effects upon those who controlled its drafting and in the
document itself. For example, the leading force for what ultimately
became the code was Frederick II.132 He, in turn, was a great
student of Voltaire and shared many of the same views: “religious
freedom, the abolition of literary censorship and of slavery, [and]
freedom of trade . . . .”133 Moreover, other forces such as Suarez,
who was to draft the final version of the code, was a great natural
law student of Pufendorf. Indeed, the entire structure of the code is
based on Pufendorf’s understanding of how the law should be.134
Such influences do not even begin to cover the love the King had
for Montesquieu, in fact the only idea of Montesquieu that seems
to have been wholly rejected by the King in the ALR was the
notion of separation of powers.135
When time came to actually write a code, Frederick turned to
Samuel von Cocceji, in 1746, ordering him to “draw up a legal
code based solely upon reason and the constitutions of the
provinces.”136 Owing to wars and aristocratic opposition, work did
not resume on the code until the late 1770’s.137
Finally, we move to the text of the code and its initial draft to
show what influence the natural law may have had. In
Introduction, Section 1 of an earlier draft of the ALR, it is stated,
“Roman law, being founded on natural equity, and the principles of
sound reason, it is not surprising that the Christians have made it
preferable to any other.” Moreover, the code tells us, “Our chief
attention was to lay down the most natural principles”138 and that
132. Lucke, supra note 9, at 13-24 (noting the King’s influence over the
Code).
133. Id. at 13. Moreover, throughout the King’s control, he remained
respectful of other religions. He even stated in 1740 that, “All religions are equal
and good, provided only that the people who profess them are honest.” Id. at 17.
134. Id. at 14.
135. Id. at 16.
136. Id. at 17.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Introduction, § 11 of THE FREDERICIAN CODE, supra note 14.
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the law’s “end is justice which consists in giving everyone his
own.”139
Further, the king began to adopt wholesale central doctrines of
the Enlightenment natural law, most notably equality before the
law.140 In fact, the King brought his former order (that judges must
apply natural equity without regard to person or statute) and
transplanted it into his own introduction to the Code as Section 22,
which states, “The laws of the state bind all its members,
regardless of status, rank or gender.”141 Other Enlightenment
notions, such as neutrality of government towards religion, were
brought into the Code, as Lucke observes:
The beliefs residents of the state hold of God and of things
divine, their faith, and their internal worship, cannot be
made the subject of strict laws. Every resident in the state is
entitled to unqualified freedom of faith and conscience.
Neither churches nor their parishioners are allowed to
persecute or insult other churches or their parishioners.142
Still further, the Enlightenment notion that property is an
inherent right in being human is strongly apparent in the code. For
Introduction, Section 75 orders, “The State is obliged to
compensate a person who is forced to sacrifice his particular rights
and advantages in the interest of the public welfare.” These
property rights are protected further in the code as well: “the state
may force a person to sell his property only if the public welfare
requires it.”143
Finally, there is one portion of the code that reflects a
quintessential Enlightenment natural law theory that would not be
recognized in our own nation’s Constitution144 until the end of the
139. Pt. I, Bk. I, tit. II, § 2 of THE FREDERICIAN CODE, supra note 14.
140. Lucke, supra note 9, at 18.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 21 (internal quotations omitted).
143. Id. at 23 (citing to Pt. I, tit. 11, § 4).
144. There has been blatant comparison between the Prussian Code and other
Constitutional documents which protect “the basic law of freedom” Id. (citing to
H. HATTENHAUER, ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FUR DIE PREUßISHEN STAATEN
VON 1794 (Frankfurt & Berlin 1970)).
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Civil War145—slavery is in violation of the natural law. Part II,
Title 5, sections 196 & 197146 prohibit slavery in Prussia and
prohibited anyone under its control form owning slaves. This rule
flows necessarily from what is said in Part I, Title 3, Sections 26 &
27, “No one may force another to act or limit another’s freedom in
some other way without a special legal justification for doing so.
No one may force another to refrain from certain conduct only on
the ground that the conduct would be harmful to the other.”147
B. The Austrian Civil Code
The Austrian Code is without a doubt one of the great natural
law codes of Europe.148 To this end, one may see the natural law
influences, like in all the codes studied in this essay, in both those
people who influence it and in the written words that ultimately
occupied its pages.
The influence on the code, drafted under Joseph II and Leopold
II, began early in both of these ruler’s lives. Co-Empress of the
Holy Roman Empire, Maria Theresa, had her children taught in the
natural law by the most prominent thinker in the kingdom, Anton
von Martini. After Joseph II came to power upon his father’s
death, and received true political power after his mother’s passing,
he openly opposed torture, and reserved the death penalty for only
the most serious offenses.149 He supported what some may call a
due process rule by “defend[ing] the integrity of the ordinary
courts.”150 By 1776, the emperor had banned torture and soon
thereafter ended the death penalty. It is even more important to
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1: “Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”
146. Lucke, supra note 9, at 23-24. However, the author is careful to note
that the institution of serfdom remained.
147. Id. at 23.
148. Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 650.
149. Lucke, supra note 9, at 24.
150. Id. at 24 (these actions were taken prior to the adoption of the Great
Code).
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note that based on his understanding of Enlightenment natural law,
the Emperor allowed for a freedom of conscience much like that of
Prussia, and sought to end censorship for the most part.151
The many drafts of the Austrian code shed light on the massive
influence of natural law on the final version. It has been noted that
the commission called to write the Code for Maria Theresa was
instructed to write a code based simply on “the rules of reason and
natural law,” and that the draft resulting from the order provided,
“the state of liberty is given to all men by nature” and “liberty is a
natural faculty to do what one chooses unless restricted by force of
law.”152 After Francis II succeeded his brother Leopold II (who
had succeeded Joseph II), he turned away Martini’s draft of a new
code, and subjected it to more revision, with one of his own
students heading the project.
However, Martini’s ideas did survive as an official code in
other provinces (Eastern and Western Galicia). This code came
into force when the main Austrian Code was still in the drafting
stage. This draft became known as Martini’s “principles of public
order” and are said to have “constitute[d] the philosophy of the
natural lawyers in a nutshell. They also show[ed] their political
timidity when faced with the power of monarchy.”153 Of particular
note for our purposes are the following provisions:
“Law” has two meaning: one is the rule which prescribes
lawful conduct, the other the natural freedom or the
permission to act which everyone has if he fits his conduct
into the framework of the rules (§3). Rights and duties
either flow from human nature in which case they are
called natural or inborn rights and duties, or they are based
on a particular society in which case they are called
positive rights and duties, i.e., those which have arisen by
virtue of the life of the society. (§4) . . . This ultimate goal
is the general welfare of the state, i.e., personal safety,
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id. at 26. Also, it should be noted that the draft was declined not because
of its natural law content but simply because it was too long. Id.
153. Id. at 27.
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property and all the other rights of its members. (§7)154
As noted above, the Austrian Code was not finished until sixty
years after the Empress had begun its creation. The final version of
the code did not contain most of the rules on public order.
However, the final draft does have a provision that, as will be
shown shortly, correlates heavily to the Ninth Amendment. Section
7 of the final version states:
If a case cannot be decided by applying the words or the
natural meaning of a statute, one must take into
consideration similar cases which are dealt with in other
statutes in a definite manner and the reason behind such
statutes, if doubt remains, the case must be decided by
applying natural legal principles, having given mature
consideration to the carefully gathered circumstances.
C. The Code Civil
In his address to the French assembly, Portalis openly
announced his natural law influences for the entire world to
recognize:
154. Id. at 27, n. 166. The same author has arranged these principles in a
different manner. Stating that:
Communities are association of people who have united in accordance
with certain rules in order to achieve a particular purpose (§5). The
State is such a community, united and bound together under a common
ruler to achieve an ultimate goal (§6). Thus ultimate goal, adapted to
the nature of man and therefore unchangeable, is the general welfare of
the state, i.e. the protection of the personal safety, property and of all
the other rights of its members (§§6 & 7). Rights and duties are of two
kinds: (1) those which are natural or inborn, flow from human nature
and are unchangeable, i.e., they cannot be changed by a positive law
and (2) those which are positive in the sense that they flow from the life
of the particular society and are articulated by the rule as prescriptions
and rules, called laws, which are required to attain the ultimate goal of
the State (§§ 4, 7 & 8). Rules which give guidance to people for their
conduct and which prescribed their duties emerge from the whole body
of the law (§2). Positive rules enacted by the ruler may be good or bad.
They are good only when they contain something good according to the
circumstances and consequences and when they contribute to general
wellbeing (§1). The totality of all the laws that determine the mutual
rights and duties of the inhabitant of inter se constitute its private law.
The private law for West Galicia is contained in this law book (§9). Id.
at 28-29.
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Law is universal reason, supreme reason based on the very
nature of things. Legislation is, or ought to only be, law
reduced to positive rules, to specific precepts . . . reason, as
it governs all men for all time, is called natural law . . . that
which is not contrary to the laws is lawful . . . the judiciary,
established to apply laws, needs to be guided in this
application by certain rules. We have outlined them. They
are such that the private reason of no man can prevail over
the law, which embodies public reason.155
Moreover, in his draft of the code, Portalis had written, “There
exists a natural and immutable law, the source of all positive
legislation: it is nothing but natural reason, in so far as it governs
all men.”156
What is even more important for the purposes of this paper is
to whom the code was being addressed. The drafters were likely
not as focused on the outcome of the code as they were with who
was going to be reading it—Napoléon. Like all great leaders of his
time, Napoléon was a natural law thinker, even if there is some
disagreement as to the degree to which he accepted the more
theoretical side of the movement. He is said to have been an
admirer of King Frederick the Great (the ruler responsible for the
Prussian Code) and of Rousseau.157 And he opposed cruel and
unusual punishment in the form of torture. Indeed, the French
Code civil adopted the Revolution’s and the Enlightenment’s rally
cry: liberty, equality and brotherhood.158 It abolished classes and
155. Id. at 31; also a person schooled in the natural law will be able to see the
influence of Domat in these statements. Others have noted the natural law
influence on the Code civil as well. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 69 (stating
“Despite the silences and even denials of the drafters, the Code cannot be fully
understood without taking into account the contribution of [] the natural law
thinkers….”).
156. PROJET DE CODE CIVIL, PRESENTE PAR LA COMMISSION NOMMEE PAR LE
GOUVERNEMENT, LE 24 THERMIDOR AN VIII (1801), Preliminary Book of Law
and Legislation, tit. I, art. I (Special thank you to Professor John Randall Trahan
for the translation).
It should be noted, however that this provision was ultimately left out of the
Code civil, but did manage to appear in the Louisiana Digest of 1808 and in
Civil Code art. 21, which is now art. 4 in the current Code.
157. Lucke, supra note 9, at 30.
158. Id. at 33.
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privileges pertaining to the private law, and thus achieved
(ostensibly) the foundation of the natural law—equality in the
law.159
Moreover, the Code civil was destined to essentially achieve
the second most profound theory of the natural law era. This theory
that natural law is universal and that such universal principles are
“capable of extension beyond European societies”160 needs only be
adjusted to fit into the society in which they do their work, which
was closely linked to Grotius’ understanding of international law.
Owing to Napoléon’s military and political power, and the sheer
acceptability of the Code civil, a number of other countries have
been greatly affected by the French Code civil.161 Natural law
became a basis for several areas of the code, such as obligations—
being the means by which individuals transferred property and that
whatever harm one causes by his fault, he is required to repair it.162
D. The Natural Law and The Constitution163
The Constitution itself is teeming with the natural law, so much
so that one would be justified in suggesting that not only has it
embraced the natural law, but also that it has become the natural
law. By this I mean to suggest that the saying “an unjust law is no
law at all” has become “an unconstitutional law is no law at all.”164
Such a transformation is not unreasonable. After all, the framing
159. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 70 (stating that the [code] “is imprinted
with the Revolutionary principle of equality before the law.”).
160. Glenn, supra note 5, at 766.
161. Belgium, Luxemburg, Monaco, Italy, Romania, Portugal, Spain,
Louisiana, Québec, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Japan, China, Turkey,
Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Lucke, supra note 9, at 34.
162. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 69-70.
163. Others have given more thorough discussion of the natural law
influences on the Constitution than is appropriate or possible here. Kennedy,
supra note 125, at 41; Corwin, supra note 28; Robert P. George, The Natural
Law Due Process Philosophy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301 (2000-2001); Robert
P. George, Natural Law and the Constitution Revisited, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
273 (2001-2002); Massey, supra note 43.
164. Lucke, supra note 9, at 37, (suggesting that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1803) brought lex injusta non est lex to the Constitution).
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generation viewed constitutions as statements of general rules of
law that were meant to extend continuously forward165 (just like
the other Enlightenment codes). This is not to mention the fact that
the framers themselves were brought up and educated in the
heyday of the natural law/natural rights movement. This movement
stressed identifying broad generally applicable rules of law. Thus,
this section of the essay must examine exactly how the
Constitution reflects the higher law.
1. The Designation of Rights in the Declaration of
Independence
Perhaps no document better reflects the framer’s understanding
of natural law based rights than the Declaration of Independence.
For in that document, it is clearly laid out that human rights do not
come from governments, whether democratic or tyrannical, but are
inborn in human beings as of their own existence, by God and by
the natural law. This means that even though the framers took
provisions of the English Bill of Rights for inspiration on their
drafting of the Constitution, they certainly did not mean to create
English control over them. That the beliefs announced in
Declaration are natural law based is apparent from its very
opening:
[A]nd to assume among the powers of the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and
of Nature’s God entitle them …We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers form the

165. Resolutions of the Town Meeting of Concord Massachusetts, October
1776 (stating, “We conceive that a constitution in its Proper Idea intends a
system of Principles Established to secure the subject.”) (quoted in KAMMEN,
supra note 20, at 9).
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consent of the governed . . . .166
The blanket statement of the laws of nature, coupled with the
teleological idea of government, and the overarching equality, and
respect for Life, Liberty, and Property, are all hallmarks of the
natural law. It is important to note that there is no mention of the
“Rights of Englishmen.” Therefore, the understanding of natural
law as announced by the Declaration is not the English common
law notion of “artificial reason” (the notion that the rights of
Englishmen could be built in part on custom), but rather that ALL
people have inborn rights. This gives credit to what was said
above: the framers adored the common law, when it protected
human rights, but not always. It is therefore sad that the framers
did not embrace the ban on slavery right away. The realization of
that fundamental law would only be established by our
Constitution after the Civil War (1861-1865).167
2. The Structure of our Federal Government is Born out of the
Natural Law
The vast majority of Americans can recall that the federal
government has three branches: The Congress, created by Article I
of the Constitution; the Executive, created by Article II, and the
Judiciary, created by Article III. This entire structure was created
to help protect natural law-based rights.168
The framing era had taken the broad “natural law” and turned it
into a sweeping “natural rights” movement. From this
transformation, the idea obtained is that the entire purpose of

166. Numerous others have pointed out the connection between the natural
law of both the Church and of the secular Enlightenment, and the Declaration.
See Kennedy, supra note 125, at 43.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
168. By this statement, I suggest that because Montesquieu, an
Enlightenment thinker, wanted to establish a better regime to protect human
rights, it follows that a three-part separation of powers is intended to protect
natural law-based rights. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWS (1748).
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government was to secure the rights of one’s people,169 as is
evident from the above quoted Declaration. Thus, many theories
were proffered as to how to best protect one’s people from an
overreaching government. To answer this, Montesquieu developed
his three separate, yet equal, branches of government. And instead
of just having three separate departments of government that could
check each other, he theorized that governmental power should be
separate and distinct. Thus, he devised that the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial powers should be distinct. This separation
was thought to be a way of protecting the natural rights of citizens.
It is now widely accepted that the framers looked to Montesquieu
and borrowed his ideas.170 Thus, the natural law touched our
federal Constitution by inspiring the way it divided power.
3. The Natural Law and the Bill of Rights171
It has been shown that the framing generation believed in a
certain set of natural law principles that became evident in their
writing of the Bill of Rights: (1) The rights revealed by natural
law, including all rights under the rubric of the right to selfpreservation; (2) the right to property (3) freedom of conscience;
(4) freedom of communication; (5) freedom from arbitrary laws;
(6) the rights of assembly and petition; and (7) the right to selfgovernment.172 One may see in these concepts both cognates to
169. See Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 650 (noting that the Enlightenment idea
was that the sole justification for the existence of government was the protection
of individual rights).
170. Mitchell Franklin has pointed out that the Constitution as written in
Philadelphia may properly be called, “the Montesquieian constitution, because
its primary conception was the separation of powers.” See Franklin, The
Relation of the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Third
Constitution, 4 HOWARD L.J. 170 (1958) [hereinafter Relation of the Fifth]; see
also Gummere, supra note 78, at 7.
171. Others have noted the Bill of Rights as having an influence in natural
law. See Mark Hamilton Levison & Charles Sherman Kramer, The Bill of Rights
as Adjunct to Natural Law, 1991 DET. C. L. REV. 1267 (1991).
172. Kennedy, supra note 125, at 46 (The author also points out that on these
points, the Christian based natural law and the secularized natural law of the
Enlightenment are in accord).
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what has been said of the Enlightenment natural law codes and to
what appears in our Constitution. Further, it has been stated that
“[w]hile there is no textual ground on which one can conclude that
the Constitution incorporates the whole of the natural law, certain
passages indisputably attach to object right.”173 Hence they
connect to a natural law. A summarized and systematized
explanation of these connections could be as follows:
(1) That there is a right to preserve one’s self, and that this
right is protected under the Constitution is evident in the Second
Amendment,174 which has been declared to possess at its core a
right to self-defense.175 Moreover, even if one could interpret the
Second Amendment to not protect a right to self-defense, this does
not mean that the Constitution would not. For the Ninth
Amendment tells us that other rights exist which the Constitution
equally protects, one of which may be the right to self-defense.
Others have pointed out the natural law influence on the Second
Amendment.176
(2) That there is a right to own property and that this right is
somehow derived from nature without any intervention by
government is evident in a number of places. But most
importantly, it is evidenced in the Fifth Amendment,177 which

173. David C. Gray, A Prayer for Constitutional Comparativism in Eigth
Amendment Cases, 18 FED. SENT. R. 237 (2005-2006).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. II states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.”
175. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
176. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1524 (2011). The same author has even suggested
natural law influences on the Ex Post Facto clause and the Equal Protection
clause. Id. at 1526.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. V stating:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crimes, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
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protects property unless the taking of it would be for the public
use, and then it can only be taken upon compensation. It is also
found explicitly stated in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
clause. For that clause declares that no person shall “be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
(3) Freedom of conscience is represented in the freedom to
exercise one’s religion.178 One’s religious beliefs are so close to
their existence that a sudden denial of them may have severe
psychological consequences. Moreover, religion, like greed for
land and power, has caused wars and catastrophes throughout
human history. Thus, the First Amendment179 represents a
principle of natural law discovered during the Enlightenment—that
human beings should have the freedom to protect their innermost
beliefs, but should not force those beliefs upon others.180
(4) The Freedom of communication can be found within the
confines of the freedom of speech and of the press in the First
Amendment.181 It can also be found within the limited protection
afforded a free press by the natural law even in the monarchies of
England.

process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
178. Another writer has noted the natural law influence on the First
Amendment. Eugene C. Gerhart, The Doctrine of Natural Law, 26 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 76, 110 (1951) (citing Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 242-44
(1788); THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 ff. and 545 ff. (1950)).
179. U.S. CONST. amend. I states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
180. This rule has a cognate in what was said of the natural law’s freedom of
conscience influence on the Prussian Civil Code. See Lucke, supra note 9, at 21
(noting an absolute right to freedom of faith and conscience).
181. The natural law influence on the First Amendment has been shown
before. Felix Morley, The Natural Law and The Right to Self-Expression, 4 NAT.
L. INST. PROC. 75 (1951); see also Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural
Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 913 (1992-1993) (stating,
“These older ideas about freedom of speech and press—so different from those
which prevail today—illustrate the significance of the eighteenth-century natural
rights analysis for our understanding of modern constitutional rights.”)
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(5) Freedom from arbitrary law can be found in a number of
places. It can be found, most of all, in the Ninth Amendment,182
and can also be found in the Due Process clauses of the
Constitution. Although I believe that the Due Process clauses
ought to be limited to simple process and the Ninth Amendment
should address of non-enumerated rights, persuasive authority has
long decided that the Substantive Due Process of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Fifth Amendment create a host of different
rights, protected under different conditions.183 Moreover, other
scholars have investigated the natural law foundations of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process clause.
(6) The natural rights of assembly and petition may be said to
derive from the notion that the government’s purpose is to protect
its people, and that the government gathers its power from the
consent of those governed and not simply by the fixing of laws.184
This is so because a government concerned with the consent of its
people must listen to their pleas for redress. Their textual home is
the First Amendment proscriptions on prohibiting such rights.
(7) The natural right to self-government has its place in
multiple parts of the Constitution. To show the example of this—
based on text—requires using multiple provisions of the
Constitution. First, it is evident that being able to petition the
government tells us that people have some right to attempt to
change their government. The other provisions that give a
constitutional home to the natural right of self-government are not
in the Bill, but in the original Constitution. Chief among these is
the fact that both chambers of Congress are elected, that the
Executive is elected, and that even the Judiciary must go through
182. U.S. CONST. amend. IX states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”
183. See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive
Power Through Substantive Due Process, 60 FL. L. REV. 519 (2008).
184. See Declaration of Independence (noting that the only just government
is one that derives its powers from “the consent of the governed”) available at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html.
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an elected body to be approved. Moreover, Article IV, Section 4
tells us that the Federal Government must guarantee to each state a
republican form of government. As we all know, a republican form
of government is self-governing.
(8) There is, moreover, another facet of the natural law that
appears in the Constitution. This can be seen in the Eight
Amendment.185 Another scholar has pointed out that “the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment” is an
example of the natural law being connected with the
Constitution.186 According to that scholar, the determination of
what is cruel under the Amendment “is not the same as
determining what the framers and other residents of late-eighteenth
century America thought was cruel.”187 But instead, determining
what is cruel under the Eighth Amendment is to determine what is
now and always has been cruel and unusual punishment. One may
see cognates to cruel and unusual punishments in the European
model of abolishing torture of war prisoners as a result of natural
law theory.188 For there, as in the Eighth Amendment, we are
dealing with government confining people and subjecting them to
a type of punishment for which they have not been convicted and,
likely, do not deserve.
Finally, we arrive at perhaps the most apparent invocation of
the natural law in the Constitution—the Ninth Amendment.189 The
Ninth
Amendment
has
already
been
called
the
190
“natural law’s logical textual home within the Constitution.” It
has further been stated, “the founders intend the Ninth Amendment
185. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states: “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
186. Gray, supra note 173.
187. Id.
188. Lucke, supra note 9, at 24 (noting the natural law-based opposition to
torture).
189. The natural law content of the Ninth Amendment has been discussed
many times before. See note 177, and see Thomas E. Towe, Natural Law and
the Ninth Amendment, 2:2 PEPP. L. REV. 270 (1975).
190. Massey, supra note 43.
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to serve multiple purposes, including a role as a judicially
enforceable source of natural law rights.”191
Now, it may be horrifying to some to suggest that a court may
look to the Ninth Amendment and simply create rules based on
natural law. That fear is erroneous for two reasons. First, the
natural law is not simply looking up to the clouds to find an
answer, but is rather “reason, unaffected by desire.”192 By this I
mean that the natural law is supposed to be discovered based upon
rational, axiomatic principles. Second, we may curtail any attempts
by the judiciary to create rules out of whole cloth by adopting the
method by which the civil law has long handled the natural law as
it relates to their written codes. This is the above-mentioned
civilian method.
As spelled-out in detail by Professor Franklin, the natural law
does not have to be formless.193 Rather, we use the civilian method
to control it. Thus, it is the natural law that a judge ought to
compare to the provisions of the document to create new rules. The
natural law and the understanding of the framing era may be used
to “fill up” the broad provisions of the Constitution, but creating
other rights that are not historically provided for should come
through analogical development of the text. The Civilians call this
method “au-delà du Code civil mais par le Code civil” (beyond the
civil code but through the civil code).194 Constitutional scholars,
such as Professor Coenen of LSU Law, have unintentionally
studied this method by calling it the “combination analysis.”195

191. Id. at 50-51.
192. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS at Bk. III, ch. 16.
193. See generally Franklin, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 116
(explaining how the Ninth Amendment reflects the civil law method and how
such a method may curb judicial attempts at simply making up rules).
194. I am leaving a full discussion of the civilian legal method and its effects
on the Constitution to a possible later essay. This serves as a mere introduction
to that topic.
195. See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PENN.
L. REV. (forthcoming) (stating, “Most familiarly, the Court has indicated that
multiple rights-based provisions of the Constitution might sometimes require the
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Indeed, as stated before, the text of the Ninth Amendment
supports such an interpretation—because we are not supposed to
use the rights listed to deny those not expressly protected, we must
use the enumerated rights to divine those that are not expressly
protected.
4. The Argument from Phraseology
Further still, the very phrasing of all of these rights in the
Constitution denotes a natural law. For all of these rights are not
ones being granted by the Constitution or the government. They
are phrased as “the right.” Meaning they are phrased as preexisting rights.196 They not only pre-date any laws that may apply
to them, but they also pre-date the Constitution. Thus, one must
ask, “where do these rights comes from?” The answer obviously
cannot be the common law; for by declaring independence, the
framers broke with the common law.197 Even if one assumes a
common law basis for these rights, he or she must also assume a
natural law basis, as it is well-established that the common law had
a substantial natural law basis, although generally drawn from the

invalidation of government action that each provision would permit in
isolation.”).
196. My argument is strengthened by the words of Thomas Jefferson, who
stated:
I deride with you the ordinary doctrine, that we brought with us from
England the common law rights. This narrow notion was a favorite in
the first movement of rallying to our rights against Great Britain. But, it
was that of men who felt their rights before they had thought of their
explanation. The truth is, that we brought with us the rights of men; of
expatriated men.
See letter from Jefferson to Tyler, Monticello, 17 June 1812, in 6 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 65 (H.A.Washington ed., 1854) (cited in Franklin,
Concerning the Influence, supra note 41, at 645).
197. It should be noted that:
[I]mmediately after the Revolution, there was a widespread feeling that
efforts should be made to develop a particular American jurisprudence,
which would not be just a slavish imitator of the English common law,
but would be eclectic—selecting the best principles and methods form
whatever system they might be found.
STEIN, CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE, supra note 58, at 415.
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facts of each case or situation. Moreover, they could not have
come from the English crown, otherwise it would have been unjust
for the revolutionaries to have broken away—if the rights were
derived from the crown, then the crown would have had every
authority to take them away. Moreover, the rights could not have
come simply from their having been English subjects. Once they
left the crown, they were no longer English subjects and thus
would not have had these “rights.” Not only that, but as has been
noted above, not everyone living in the United States was
English.198 Nor did they all consider themselves English. Even
among the most politically powerful of the time were some not of
English descent.199 This means that those who ratified the
Constitution (the people) would not have believed their rights
came from being English. All of these reasons, combined with
what was detailed above, conclusively show that the natural law of
the Enlightenment had a profound impact upon the American
Constitution.
Thus, one may say that reasoning from the Constitution’s
text—a strictly positivist notion—leads to a complete refutation of
legal positivism. If we are going to understand the Constitution at
all, or understand it as an Enlightenment code, we must understand
its natural law composition, and be able to apply it to our
interpretation of the document.
Lastly, I must mention that like the civilians and their codes,
the framers had to bow to political pressure. Just as the Prussian
drafters and Martini wanted to limit the intrusion of the monarchy
on human rights, but had to give way to the politically powerful
kings at the time, so too did many framers want to curtail slavery
under the natural law but were forced to yield to the politically

198. See text accompanying note 38.
199. For example, James Wilson, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and
a signatory of the Declaration of Independence, was born and raised in Scotland.
See STEIN, CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE, supra note 58, at 415.
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powerful slave-holding states. In any event, the Constitution is still
influenced by the natural law.200
IV. ARTICLE III: THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CODES AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
The last two qualities of an Enlightenment era code are these:
completeness and abrogation.201 Abrogation, on one hand, is the
theory that the new code does more than simply compile or restate
the existing law, but rather terminates the existing law from having
any force at all—even subsidiary force. The old law cannot even
be used to fill in the gaps between the new written laws, although it
may be used to help define terms and fill up broadly-written
provisions. Completeness, on the other hand, means that the
document covers the totality of civil society,202 on either the whole
spectrum of law or on a specific era of law and is meant to be such
for a very long period of time.203 Completeness itself has two
primary methods of obtaining this goal: specific enumeration or
broadly written law. One may see that the Constitution uses both of
these methods and fulfills both of these functions.

200. As Lucke stated, “Despite the unavoidable compromises forced upon
the draftsmen by the political realities of their time, the ALR is a true child of
the natural law tradition and of the Enlightenment.” Likewise, the sheer force of
the slave-holding powers ought not be weighed against the natural law
influences of the Constitution. See Lucke, supra note 9, at 24.
201. Professor Moréteau points out that the key difference between Codes
and Digests is the abrogation clause. Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note
13, at 37.
202. Glenn, supra note 5, at 766.
203. Napoléon summarized the theory of the codes lasting for extended
periods by saying: “My true glory is not that I have won forty battles; Waterloo
will blow away the memory of these victories. What nothing can blow away,
what will live eternally, is my Civil Code.” Alain A. Levasseur, Code Napoléon
or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 764 (1969).

638

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

A. Abrogation204
The notion of abrogation has been used since Justinian’s
Corpus Juris Civilis, when the Emperor released his lawyers from
ever having to cite to the old law again, and that the new body of
law was the sole source, complete in itself.205 This same idea
carried over to each one of the great codes of Europe.206
The Louisiana Supreme Court summarized the need for
abrogation in the now-infamous case of Cottin v. Cottin:207
It must not be lost sight of, that our civil code is a digest of
the civil laws, which were in force in this country, when it
was adopted; that those laws must be considered as
untouched, wherever the alterations and amendments,
introduced in the digest, do not reach them; and that such
parts of those laws only are repealed, as are either contrary
to, or incompatible with the provisions of the code.208
Thus, in order to say that the Constitution is a code, in the vein
of the Enlightenment, it must be shown that it decisively broke
from the prior law. Now, there are many methods by which
abrogation can be done. The most powerful is expressed

204. It may be best to give an overall summary of my “abrogation”
discussion in a footnote: Abrogation essentially means that, for the area of law
covered by the code, any former existing law is no longer controlling. This
makes the code, in the understanding of the Enlightenment, entirely different
from ordinary statutes. For if a code were to be passed dealing with private
contract law, it would be presumed that any existing law on the subject—even
that not in conflict with the code, is now abridged and the sole source of law is
the code. This is distinguished from a statute, whose purpose is to address very
specific situations, because one statute can be passed that touches on private
contract law, which is not repugnant to the former statute on private contract
law, and the former will still have force. Likewise, the American Constitution
abrogated the common law on fundamental rules for government.
205. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 35 (noting that Justinian had
forbidden any comments on his work, believing it to cover every possible
situation).
206. WATSON, supra note 14, at 131 (noting that in the Codes of Europe, the
prior law ceases to have even subsidiary force and stating, “What is wanted is
the correct interpretation of the code provision, not its forerunners.”).
207. 5 Mart. (O.S.) 93 (1817).
208. Id. at 94.
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abrogation.209 This is, of course, an article of a code, which states
that all prior laws are abrogated. The second method is tacit repeal,
where something about the new law makes it obvious that all of the
old law was repealed.210 It is the second method by which the
Constitution abrogates all prior public law.
First, I must admit that no rational person would even suggest
that the Constitution did not abrogate the English and European
rules on government. That is to suggest, no one would say when
addressing a possible gap about what the powers of government
are, or what the rights of persons are, by asking what is done in
England or France. That question would only come into play in
defining or filling up the broad provisions of the law. Moreover,
this point is made even clearer by the rule that “all interpretation of
the Constitution must begin with its text.”211 For if the document
did not abrogate all prior law and there were a gap in the type of
law covered by the Constitution, then that gap would have
certainly been discovered by now; and for the answers to that
question, the justices would have appealed to the pre-existing rules
of law without reference to the Constitution.
Further, the Constitution creates a general government of
enumerated powers. All those powers that the national government
has are found in the Constitution, with others only coming in as
necessary and proper to fulfill the government’s other powers.212
Thus, it is clear that the Constitution abrogated any common law
rules on the powers of government. For example, in England the
national government was able to establish a church, which is
anathema to the American Constitution, and is expressly made so
by the Establishment clause of the First Amendment.
209. Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 37 (noting that there is
generally a requirement of an abrogation clause).
210. It is by this method that the modern Louisiana Code abrogates the old.
211. Indeed, even those who may be considered “living constitutionalists”
must begin the analysis with the text of the Constitution even if they do not end
there.
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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Put simply, abrogation is the reason why, in determining if the
federal government can do some act, we ask (1) does the
Constitution say the government can, and (2) if so, does the
Constitution elsewhere say that the government can’t? If the
Constitution had not abrogated the prior law, the questions would
be (1) does the Constitution say you can, (2) if not, do the other
laws say you can (3) if so, does something else in the Constitution
say you can’t? Thus, the American Constitution is the sole source
of foundational law that, at a minimum, the government must
obey, and the sole source of that general government’s powers.213
There are, however, two clauses in the Constitution that may
seem at first glance to defeat my argument for abrogation. The first
is Article VI,214 which tells us that all debts incurred by the
national government under the Articles of Confederation are to be
held to the same extent against the new government. One may
suggest that if the new government is taking care of the debts of
the old, then the old is not really gone. In response, I argue that
taking on responsibilities of the former regime does not undo
abrogation. In fact, it furthers my argument. For, by officially
announcing that the former is gone and that the new will hold its
debts, the charter is stating that the former is actually gone.
Moreover, taking care of the other’s debts does not mean that the
former regime is not gone. Indeed, the Article is nothing more than
an assurance that the people who created the federal government
would not be defaulting on their promises to foreign nations.
Lastly, the Confederation is long since dead. Any bond it had not
paid back by the time of the Philadelphia convention has most
certainly been paid back by now. Thus, if the Article could once

213. As will be evident below, this aspect of abrogation bleeds into
completeness.
214. U. S. CONST. art. VI states in pertinent part: “All Debts contracted and
Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as
valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the
Confederation . . . .”
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have been read as defeating abrogation, it could not be so now, the
target of clause itself is long resolved.
The second portion of the Constitution which may give
abrogation trouble is the Seventh Amendment, which states that:
In suits at common law, where the value on controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
One may argue that the mention of the “common law” in the
Amendment signify that the common law has not been abrogated
for constitutional reasons. This argument fails to comprehend the
fact that codes frequently adopt old rules. This clause does nothing
but adopt the term “common law” in the first instance to described
lawsuits, and merely adopts “common law” in the second instance
to denote the procedure by which the jury verdicts may be
reexamined.215 Put another way, the Seventh Amendment merely
reflects that the Constitution received a portion of the common
law.
B. Completeness216
If one understood the Constitution to simply be a super
common law jurisdiction statute, it would have to be understood to
have dealt solely with the problems of the time and to have been
immediately actionable by the people at the time of the framing.
However, if one understands the Constitution as a supreme code,
215. I thank my friend, Brian Strand, for pointing out these two arguments to
me.
216. I believe it best to summarize “completeness” in a footnote for those
unfamiliar with the concept: The Constitution’s arena of law is public law,
setting the foundation of the government’s relationship with the people and vice
versa. In this arena, the Constitution is complete. It covers everything that could
possibly happen. Moreover, like the codes, it is complete in the sense that it is
finished, i.e., it is capable of extending into the future without constant revision.
This makes the Constitution different from regular statutes, whose rules cover
only very small portions of law and are intended to deal with very specific
incidents.
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then it would in fact cover every situation placed before it. We
have, since the beginning of our republic, interpreted the
Constitution in the latter vein. For as the Marbury court noted, the
Constitution is not some static legal code,217 similar to one which
could have seen in England at the time. Rather, it is meant to
extend eternally forward and touch on every debate that may be
presented to it.218
The first method of extending eternally forward to every case is
generality.219 Portalis articulated the general rule that a code ought
not to provide rules that are immediately applicable to every
conceivable concrete case. On the contrary, it must lay down the
rules of law broadly enough to regulate all situations of a certain
type that may arise from human interaction and must not lay down
specific solutions relating to particular circumstances.220 However,
the code must also be practical and not abstract to the point that it
would be worthless.221 In solving this conundrum, Portalis stated:
How does one arrest the passing of time? How can one
oppose the course of events or the imperceptible change of
custom? How can one know and calculate in advance
things which only experience can reveal? Can foresight
ever extend to things our minds cannot grasp? . . . Many
things are therefore necessarily left to the arbitration of
judges. The function of the [Code] is to set down, in broad
terms, the general maxims of law, to establish principles
rich in consequences, and not to deal with particulars of the
questions that may arise on every subject. It is left to the
magistrate and the jurisconsult, fully alive to the overall
spirit of laws, to guide their application.222

217. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
218. Id. at 177.
219. See Olivier Moréteau, Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and
Alibis: The Experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C.J. INT’L & COM. REG.
273, 275 (1994-1995) (discussing the use of broad generalities within the civil
codes) [hereinafter Codes as Straight-Jackets].
220. Bergel, supra note 11, at 1082.
221. Id.
222. See Lucke, supra note 9, at 32.

2015]

SECUNDUM CIVILIS

643

The second method of covering every possible situation is
specific enumeration. Simply put, this method held that a code
could set forth the rule for every single possible situation. The
Prussian Code is generally thought of as using this method. This is
the same method that was used by Justinian and his CJS.223
However, both ultimately suffered the same consequences. The
CJS needed frequent updating to the point that a fourth portion was
added.224 Likewise, the Prussian Code needed almost constant
updating, for specific enumeration cannot arrest the passage of
time. That is, until the American Constitution’s theory of the
general government, specific enumeration could not arrest the
passage of time. Thus, specific enumeration is maintainable if the
powers given are specifically limited.
The genius of the Constitution is that it does not disregard
specific enumeration for broad generality, nor does it do away with
broad generality. Thus, it has accomplished the same feat as the
European codes—it found the perfect middle ground between
general and specific, theoretical and practical.225 Indeed, it has
already been stated that, “[The] emancipation from particularism is
characteristic, above all, in the succinct Constitution of the United
States and in terse code of the modern civil law, such as that of
France….”226 The same author noted, “the flexible texts of the
Fourteenth Amendment and elsewhere may be called abstract . . .
universals;” a comparison may thus be made between “due
process” in the Constitution and “good faith” of the codes.227
These abstract universals and the broad generalities in which
the Amendments are written, especially those on individual rights,

223. STEIN, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 35.
224. This portion was called the Novels, which consisted of Justinian’s own
enactments. Id.
225. Gummere, supra note 78 (showing that the framers took general
“principles into the instrument without trying to particularize too explicitly how
they should be put into effect”).
226. Franklin, Relation of the Fifth, supra note 170.
227. Id.

644

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

allow for growth in the law.228 The framers believed that human
rights were essentially innumerable. It follows that they would
have written these provisions broadly to allow them to grow and
morph to meet future situations. Such a connection between the
goals of individual rights being construed broadly and the
understanding of the codes in Europe was unmistakably given by
Justice Story in the 1816 opinion of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee:229
The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious
sense, and not in a sense unreasonable restricted or
enlarged.230 The constitution unavoidably deals in general
language. It did not suit the purposes of the people in
framing this great charter of our liberties to provide for
minute specifications of its powers, or to declare the means
by which those powers should be carried into execution.231
The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the
exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long
lapse of ages the events of which were locked up in the
inscrutable purposes of Providence.232 It could not have
been foreseen what new changes and modifications of
power might be indispensable to effectuate the general
principles of the charter.233
228. It has already been shown that these broad generalities are written for
the purpose of allowing jurisprudence to adapt to changing situations, without
breaking entirely from either the spirit or the letter of the law. This rule of the
legislative drafting in the civil law, as opposed to legislative drafting in the
common law world was summarized by Professor Moréteau, who has written,
“[M]any people in common law jurisdictions tend to regard the law in a codified
system as rigid, because they tend not to appreciate that the civil law legislature
is content with enunciating general principles….” Moréteau, Codes as StraightJackets, supra note 219, at 275.
229. 14 U.S. 304, 327; 1 Wheat 304, 331 (1816).
230. This is a well-known code theory that the whole document was drafted
to be understood by the common man. See Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra
note 13, at 62 (discussing that in the context of civil code, the law must be
accessible to the average person).
231. Just as the codes were (1) drafted in general language, (2) not meant to
be immediately actionable or cover to a minute detail, and (3) did not provide
for how their provisions are to be carried out entirely.
232. Just as the codes were meant to arrest the passage of time and provide
the general rules for generations to come.
233. The fact that the Constitution was meant to extend eternally forward and
be relevant for the same period is noted in the preamble, when it states, “And
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” If the framers had
intended for the Constitution to act like a mere statute, placing the term
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Therefore, the Constitution’s broad general principles of law,
combined with the methods of gap-filling discussed above, bring
unforeseeable, historically unprovided-for situations under the
purview of the Constitution, thereby making it complete.
Specific enumeration is taken up in the context of the
enumerated powers of the Federal government. Aside from these
powers and those procedures that are necessary and proper to
fulfill the enumerated powers, no other authority exists for the
federal government’s actions.234 Not even a strong government
interest235 is enough to generate government power—it must be
specified in the Constitution. This presents a stark contrast to the
problem faced by the Prussian Code and the Corpus Juris’ use of
specific enumeration. In those documents we find that the specific
enumeration, setting forth very restrictive rules, lead to a need for
constant revision and update. Other answers had to be provided for
these minute situations because courts were unable to extend by
analogy the very specific clauses. The Constitution does not face
this problem. For even where it is silent, something that ostensibly
could require the creation of new powers or new rules of law (as to
the power of the federal government), it gives an answer. That
answer is, “no, the federal government cannot not do this.”236
Thus, the Constitution was able to specifically provide for every
possible instance of federal power, by making those (and those
necessary and proper thereto) the only instances of federal power.
Moreover, the Constitution, like the codes of Europe, has
devices that allowed for the document to extend continuously even
“Posterity” in the preamble would have been a terrible way of conveying the
idea.
234. Here is where the two functions bleed into each other.
235. A strong government interest, however, may allow for the government
to exercise its power against the rights of individuals—either by it being a
“legitimate government interest,” “an important government interest,” or a
“compelling government interest.” Or at least that is how the doctrine stands
now. See note 211.
236. Likewise, for issues dealing with the states, the answer is, “yes, unless
the Constitution says the states cannot.”
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in the face of apparent gaps in the law. We have already discussed
the Roman method above. But here, we will discuss it in the
context of completeness. Here, we must steer clear of the full
discussion on the civilian method of looking at the principles of
law, and maintain focus on that clause of the constitution which
declares that the analogical development of text be used—the
Ninth Amendment.
The Ninth Amendment declares that there are other rights
protected by the Constitution, even if they are not written down. It
is sad that this Amendment has not yet shown its full potential. But
by its existence the Ninth actually gives the judges who decide the
case the power to locate and protect these rights. The text of the
Ninth can actually do a great deal of work. As noted above, read to
its negative, the Amendment tells us that a judge ought to use the
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the
Constitution to discover previously unnoticed rights. Thus, the
Constitution’s listing of rights would not be confined to those
broad principles of the eighteenth century.
Read in its ordinary meaning, the Amendment may even allow
for reference to natural law in order to discover new rules on
human rights. This would be beyond the context of simply saying
that the natural law requires judges to rely upon the text.
Thus, the Ninth Amendment allows for the Constitution to
cover every possible situation which may arise involving
individual rights that are not covered in the text elsewhere. In so
discovering those rights, a court ought to look to the principles
announced in the other provisions, by reading them together to
create new rules, and by reference to the natural law when the text
of the Constitution fails to provide a solid answer. Thus, in
assuming control of the natural law, the Constitution’s protections
on the issue of individual freedoms are literally universal and
complete, because all possible protections of rights are given effect
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by the Constitution, and only an appropriate government interest237
can abrogate those protections. In so being, the Amendment is
similar to the former Section 7 of the Austrian Civil Code, which
stated:
If a case cannot be decided by applying the words or the
natural meaning of a statute, one must take into
consideration similar cases which are dealt with in other
statutes in a definite manner and the reasons behind such
statutes. If a doubt remains, the case must be decided by
applying natural legal principles, having given mature
consideration to the carefully gathered circumstances.238
Therefore, the Constitution is functionally a code, because the
document abrogates the prior law and is complete over its specific
era of law. The similarities between the framing document and the
codes of Europe can no longer be ignored. The Constitution is an
Enlightenment code.
C. Consequences
Showing that the Constitution functions like an Enlightenment
code and has the requisite other features would be a moot task, if
there were not some consequence that would result from such a
revelation. A full delineation of the consequences is saved for
another essay. However, it feels appropriate to briefly address a
few of such consequences here.

237. Because the entire purpose of the government is to protect its people, I
believe that the only interest that could weigh against a person’s rights is the
rights of others. A similar philosophy, that government’s only purpose is to
protect individual rights can clearly be seen in the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man, Article II, which clearly puts forth the Enlightenment’s thought
on the “goal” of political association, which is the preservation of natural rights.
238. This passage is very similar to current the art. 4 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, which states, “When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from
legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To
decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages,” and to
former article 21 of the Civil Code of 1870, which stated: “In all civil matters,
where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed according to equity.
To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or
received usages, where positive law is silent.”
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1. Jurisprudence
First and foremost, it cannot be denied that the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts have the power to interpret the
Constitution and to declare acts null under its provisions. Such a
power is blatantly obvious with the “arising under the
Constitution” rule in Article III. What sort of suits would “arise
under the Constitution” except for those challenging acts as not
being constitutional? The answer is none. This may, however, be
incompatible with the notion of stare decisis. It has already been
noted by prominent scholarship that the text and form of the
Constitution is anathema to stare decisis.239 The courts have just
not realized that fact yet.
As it stands now, the only way the Supreme Court will
overturn inaccurate precedent is if it is wrong enough.240 Not if it is
wrong, but only if it is wrong enough. This ought to seem absurd
to anyone familiar with the concept that judges are supposed to
interpret and apply the law, not make it. Moreover, even if lower
courts notice massive errors in the Supreme Court’s decisions, they
are bound by those prior cases. The only way a lower court may
get away with not applying the rule developed by the high court is
by somehow distinguishing the cases.
Just imagine, if there had been no binding authority to the
Supreme Court’s erroneous decision in the Slaughter House
Cases,241 then the States would likely not have gotten away with as
many atrocities as they did until the incorporation of substantive
due.

239. Franklin, The Encyclopédiste, supra note 3, at 61 (stating, “stare decisis
is not justified by the content of the Constitution.”).
240. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854
(1992) (showing that a prior decision will not be overruled absent showing that
the court must consider “prudential and pragmatic considerations,” before
overruling erroneous precedent).
241. 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (holding that the Privileges or Immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate all of the Bill of Rights against
the States).
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If we do adopt the idea that the Constitution is a supreme code,
then the decisions of the United States Supreme Court would not
be binding upon the lower courts or the Court itself. Of course,
those decisions would be binding upon the parties who happen to
be in the suit. And, of course, those decisions may help other
courts decide cases, so long as they adopt the appropriate
understanding of jurisprudence.
There are a few theories of jurisprudence in civil law
jurisdictions. The first is that of “probable doctrine,”242 where an
issue has been decided so many times by a higher court that it is
probably the right way to rule. The second is “jurisprudence
constante”243 meaning that precedent only becomes strongly
influential after it has been almost universally agreed to being the
right interpretation of the law. This is the method which is
supposed to be used in Louisiana and is widely used in civilian
jurisdictions. Considering that the majority of jurisdictions have
adopted the third method, and considering it was that method that
was ruling the day in Europe at the time of the Enlightenment, and
that it was to be used by our founders’ greatest ally, France, it
seems appropriate to state that it should be the method used.
I understand the concern about whether such a situation would
be appropriate; after all, would we want lower courts allowing
States to bypass decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education?244
Moreover, one may point out that in civilian jurisdictions, the
Constitutional Courts’ rulings are binding. It may be due to a
pragmatic development.

242. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Latin American Hybrid Constitutionalism: The
United States Presidentialism in the Civil Law, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 29, 47 (2003).
243. Doerr v. Mobile Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128: “Under the civilian
tradition, while a single decision is not binding on our courts, when a series of
decisions form a constant stream of uniform and homogenous rulings having the
same reasoning, jurisprudence constante applies and operates with considerable
persuasive authority.” (internal quotations omitted).
244. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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2. Implications for Several Current Doctrines
(1) Since this theory focuses heavily on the natural law, and
argues that there may be some sort of general jurisprudence
ordained by the Constitution, this would certainly have an impact
on the Erie245 doctrine, which appears to be based on the notions
that (1) there is no natural law, and (2) there is no general law
discoverable or which may be applied by the federal courts.
(2) This theory asserts that the Constitution adopted the
Enlightenment notion that government has only one purpose—the
protection of human rights. If this is so, then the only legitimate
government interest (as hinted at above) is the protection of
individuals from others and the government. Such a consideration
would have massive implications for weighing government interest
against human rights in the context of equal protection, and
substantive due process.246
(3) Since this theory would require comparison of the text and
discerning fundamental principles embedded in the text, we would
be forced to review the notion of constitutional protections for
juridical persons. By this I mean that in reading the Bill of Rights it
is clear that “persons” within the meaning of the Constitution have
the capacity to enjoy all the rights listed in the document, and are
protected under it, even though they cannot yet exercise those
rights, until they are taken away after due process is given. Thus, it
cannot be that one may start out with enjoyment of some rights and
not others. But this is exactly what the American corporate
personhood doctrine suggests—that there are some constitutional
persons that may have the capacity of enjoyment for some but not
all of these rights initially,247 even before they are taken away with
245. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64; 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938)
(overruling the general federal common law).
246. See generally Dragovich v. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 845 F. Supp. 2d
1091 (U.S. N.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing rational basis review and strict scrutiny
review for substantive due process).
247. For example, corporations do not have the right against selfincrimination. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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due process. Therefore, if my theory is adopted, either corporations
have the capacity of enjoyment for every single right, both
enumerated and non-enumerated (as natural persons) or they have
none. But since it has already been agreed that it is logically
impossible for corporations to enjoy some rights (the right against
self-incrimination, since corporations lack an actual “self”), then
that means they cannot be considered “persons” within the
meaning of the Constitution. Thus, they have no constitutionally
protected rights; they have only those created by ordinary statute.
(4) Substantive due process will be a thing of the past under my
theory, because we are to give an average person reading to the
words of a law. But a provision that speaks to “process” means
only that: “process.” The only way to logically get “substance” out
of “process” would be if there were really no difference between
them.248 Moreover, all the work of substantive due process would
already have been done by the Privileges or Immunities clause
incorporating all of the rights held by the federal government
against the states.249 This would also mean, of course, that the
Privileges or Immunities clause would have to incorporate all of
the unwritten rights of the Constitution.250
(5) Because we would likely adopt other code based
theories,251 we would likely adopt the use of foreign law to help fill
up the broad provisions on human rights, so long as that foreign
law had a similar basis in its development as our constitutional
provision. I can think of no better example than the Eighth
248. If that were so, then the Erie doctrine would be wrong for yet another
reason.
249. The Supreme Court has basically “incorporated” all of the Bill of Rights
against the states. The most recent being the right to bear arms of the Second
Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742; 130 S. Ct. 3020
(2010).
250. In relation to this idea and to what was written about the Slaughter
House Cases above, another writer has shown the influence of civilian theory on
the Fourteenth Amendment. Jared Bianchi, Anything but Common: The Role of
Louisiana’s Civilian Tradition in the Development of Federal Civil Rights
Jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 177 (2013).
251. One of which would also be “abuse of rights,” but this is left to another
essay.
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Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.252 However,
because we must relay back and forth between the texts of the
Constitution, I must sadly admit that such use of foreign law could
not abolish the death penalty. However, it could end imprisonment
for drug offenses, as many other nations have begun to abolish
such actions. The more that other nations change their treatment of
drug offenders and users, the more the United States would
become increasingly “unusual” in its treatment of drug offenders.
Such a disparity between the United States and other nations could
inform our understanding of what is cruel and unusual.
(6) Original intent would be dead. The intent of the framers—
by that, I mean their original application of the Constitution—
would only be one part of the puzzle in interpreting the broad
provisions of the Constitution. However, resort should be made to
the original understanding in “defining” what the words mean. For
example, if the Constitution contained the word “fence,” but that
word actually meant what we call today a “dog,” it would be
imperative to know what the framers definition was in order to
help locate the appropriate principle.
With this in mind, I realize that there would be an
insurmountable amount of disinterest in adopting my idea as a
whole. Even though conceptually the Constitution is an
Enlightenment code, many would likely not wish to adopt all of
these consequences.
V. CONCLUSION
Two centuries ago, at the height of the Enlightenment age, our
founders set forth the national charter—a document filled with
natural law influence and lessons from Roman legal history. Its
passages distilled these higher and ancient laws—derived from
religion, reason, and nature—through practical experience into a
252. I am glad to see that this has already been done in part. Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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Constitution that abrogated control of the prior regimes and gave
answers to all questions relevant to the fundamental law of our
nation. All of these facts make the Constitution conceptually
identical to the great codes of Europe, and like those legal titans,
our Constitution has survived war, national poverty, and
unpredictable social changes. But what has been overlooked is this:
the Constitution has not had to undergo the full scale changes of
the Enlightenment codes, it does not have the danger of an
auxiliary code that may draw it out of the center of our national
legal structure, and instead of merely adopting the natural law, it
has become the natural law. Therefore, not only can we say that the
Constitution is a code in a small compass, but we may also be
justified in saying that it is the best code of them all.

